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A. INTRODUCTION: SECURITIES REGULATION, THE DIRECTOR
AND DISCRETON
A necessary concomitant of governmental management of the economy
is the regulation of the issuance and sale of securities to the public. Ostensibly,
the function of public distribution of securities is to raise new capital to
finance business activity, and as such, it is deemed to serve legitimate and
necessary economic and social purposes.1 Securities legislation is designed to
reinforce this mechanism of modem capitalism; its broad objective is to create
and maintain public confidence in capital markets2 and to enhance the position
of the securities industry in the economic life of the province.3
Securities regulation may be broadly defined as "any kind of requirement
that some positive action be taken either before one of a designated class of
persons engages in the securities business or before a given security may be
offered or sold". 4 In Ontario, this type of regulatory system is established by
The Securities Act,5 and it is administered and enforced by the Ontario
Securities Commission.6
The nature and the administration of the Act in general have been the
subject of considerable attention in other forums, 7 and it is only necessary
* Mr. Cowan is a member of the 1975 graduating class of Osgoode Hall Law School.
'See H. M. Bateman, State Securities Regulation (1973), 27 Southwestern L.. 759
at 762.
2 Report of the Committee of the Ontario Securities Commission on Problems of
Disclosure for Investors by Business Combinations and Private Placements, (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 1970), para. 2:02. [Hereinafter cited as the Merger Study] H. S. Bray,
"Recent Developments in Securities Administration in Ontario", in J. Ziegel, ed., Studies
in Canadian Company Law, Vol. I (Toronto: Butterworths, 1967) at 419; J. G. K.
Strathy, Address to the Investment Dealers Association, London, Ontario 25/4/72, at 19.
3 Report of the Ontario Attorney General's Committee on Securities Legislation in
Ontario, (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1965) at para. 8:03 [Hereinafter cited as the Kimber
Report].
4 Louis Loss & E. M. Cowett, Blue Sky Law, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1958) at 19.
5 R.S.O. 1970, c. 426, as amended S.O. 1971, c. 31; 1972, c. 1; 1973, c. 11.
61bid, s. 2(1). Hereinafter cited as the Commission or the O.S.C.
7 See generally, J. C. Baillie, Protection of the Investor in Ontario (1965), 8 Cana-
dian Public Administration 172 and "Securities Regulation in the Seventies", J. Zeigel,
Studies in Canadian Company Law, Vol. II (Toronto: Butterworths, 1973) at 343; W.
V. R. Smith, Securities Regulation in Ontario (1968), 4 Texas Int'L L. Forum 454; R. C.
Meech, Prospectus and Registration Requirements (1972), L.S.U.C. Annual Lectures
211; Bray, supra, note 2. For background to the present Securities Act, see supra, note 3.
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here to delineate the basic types of regulatory functions that are incorporated
in it. These may be briefly stated as the licensing of people engaged in the
securities business, the registration of securities to be offered to the public,
the investigation and prosecution required for enforcement of the Act, and
the continuous disclosure of investment information. Each function reflects
a different philosophical approach to the objective of investor protection.8
It has been said that "the most important functions of the Ontario
Securities Commission lie in the area of registration of members of the
securities industry and the administration of prospectus requirements". 9
Central to the thesis of this article is the notion that the "teeth" of the regu-
latory requirements of The Ontario Securities Act concerning registration and
prospectuses (sections 7 and 61) are to be found in the discretionary powers
of the Director of the O.S.C. contained in these sections.10 His substantive
control of access to both the securities business and the capital markets com-
prises the core of securities regulation in Ontario.
The Director"1 is the administrative head of the Commission,12 and is
regarded as a crucial figure in the administration of the Act.' s The functions
of the Director are set out in section 4, and they include those given to him
by the Act as weU as those assigned to him by the Commission. While we
are only concerned with the Director's powers under sections 7 and 61, it
is worthwhile to note that the O.S.C. has allocated to him the authority,
under sections 104(2), 116(1), 132(1) and 144, to grant exemptions in
whole or in part from the provisions of the Act relating to proxies and proxy
solicitation, insider trading, and financial disclosure, and to make orders
suspending trading in securities when it is in the public interest.' 4
The essential attribute of the Director's power is the specific discretion
given to him by statute.15 The Securities Act, according to one highly regarded
commentator, "bristles with discretions", 6 while another author states that
"the real problem in the field of securities regulation lies in the exercise of
8 Supra, note 4 at 19; see also Bray, supra, note 2 at 421.
9 Baillie, supra, note 7 at 175.
10 Smith, supra, note 7 at 462.
11 See. 1(1)6 of the Securities Act defines 'Director' as "the Director or any Deputy-
Director of the Commission". For the purposes of this paper, the Director will refer
to any one of these people.
'2 Supra, note 5, s. 4. The chief executive officer is the Chairman of the O.S.C.
pursuant to s. 3(1).
13 See Strathy, supra, note 2 at 5. In terms of remuneration, the Director receives
a salary almost the equivalent to that of the Chairman. See Ontario, Public Accounts
1972-73, Vol. I (Toronto: Queen's Printer).
14 O.S.C. Bulletin, Jan. 1968. In Obsco Corp. Ltd., O.S.C. Bulletin, March, 1967,
the Director mentioned the power under s. 19(3) which had been assigned to him by
the Commission. In 1974, the Director dealt with 62 applications under ss. 104, 116, 132
and made 360 s. 144 orders, Source O.S.C.B., March, 1975 at 63.
15 Bray, supra, note 2 at 447; Merger Study, supra, note 2 at para. 2:05; Smith,
supra, note 7 at 462; Ballie, supra, note 7 at 210.
16J. Willis, Canadian Administrative Law in Retrospect (1974), 24 U.T.L.J. 225
at 236.
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discretion by a public official. 17 A more extreme view speaks of "the shocking
strictness and breadth of administrative discretion in the regulation of the
flow of capital and of investment opportunities available to the public". 8 While
dogmatic assertions may be made about the damaging extent of governmental
interference in the capital markets, they also are directed at fundamental
principles of representative democracy, as evidenced by a recent newspaper
editorial on the subject of the discretion of the O.S.C.:
What the Commission may consider to be in the public interest may not coincide
with what is, in actual fact, in the public interest. That judgment should always
be made by the elected representatives of the people .... the power to determine
what is in the public interest.. . should be taken away from the Ontario Securi-
ties Commission and restored to the government and the Legislature where it
belongs.19
Discretion has been defined as the "power to make a choice between
alternative courses of action".20 One commentator has described it as the
"room for decisional manoeuvre possessed by the decision maker", 21 while
another viewed it as a process involving a determination that may be reached,
"in part at least, upon the basis of considerations not entirely susceptible to
proof or disproof". 22 It may be conferred explicitly by statute, be implicit in
a lack of legislative standards, or it may result from the vagueness, ambiguity
or conflict in applicable rules and policies.
Apart from these various conceptualizations, it is an accepted doctrine
that some discretion is indispensable to any scheme of regulation.23 This is
especially true in the complex field of securities, where a substantial degree
of flexibility is needed for proper regulation of the vagaries of the market
place, and where a detailed and complicated statute "must inevitably prove
unwieldy and incapable of adaptation to changing standards". 24 Thus, the
Legislature has delegated to the O.S.C., and more particularly to the Director,
wide powers of decision-making. Discretion is a means of balancing adminis-
trative imperatives of speed, efficiency, and the development of expertise
against the perceived ideal of the "rule of law" as expressed by statute and the
need for certainty upon which people may base their investment transactions.
The discretionary powers contained in The Securities Act comprise a mech-
anism that is implicitly designed to protect the public investor while ensuring
that those it regulates are not unduly hampered in the performance of their
economic function.
17 Smith, supra, note 7 at 475.
18 Bateman, supra, note 1 at 765.
19 Toronto Star, editorial, March 20, 1974.
20 J. De Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (London: Stevens, 1973)
at 246. See also, K. C. Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State U.P., 1969) at 4.
21 J. lowell, The Legal Control of Administrative Discretion, [1973] Public Law 178.
2 2 E. Freund, Administrative Powers Over Persons and Property, (Chicago: Chicago
U. Press, 1928) at 71.
28 Willis, supra, note 16 at 25; Baillie, supra, note 7 at 210; Loss and Cowett, supra,
note 4 at 62. For a recent empirical study of statutory discretion, see Law Reform Com-
mission of Canada, A Catalogue of Discretionary Power in the Revised Statutes of
Canada, 1970. (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975).
24 Baillie, supra, note 7 at 210.
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Theoretical concepts and philosophical insights into the nature of dis-
cretion and decision-making are necessary for a proper understanding of the
subject, but they are beyond the scope of this paper.25 What it seeks to ex-
amine is the scope of the discretion of the Director under sections 7 and 61,
the relationship between the exercise of this discretion and its purpose, and
possible alternatives for structuring it.
B. SCOPE OF THE DIRECTOR'S DISCRETION: REGISTRATION
1. Current Provisions
Section 6 of The Securities Act prohibits any person or company from
trading, or being connected with a trade, in securities unless they are registered
and "such registration has been made in accordance with the Act and the
regulations". This prohibitive section and the sanctions for non-compliance26
constitute the binding force behind the Director's power over registration.
However, despite the all-embracing nature of this section, the wide range of
exemptions from this requirement, found in sections 18 and 19, allow one
to avoid being subject to the discretion of the Director 27
The discretionary power of registration is contained in section 7(1):
The Director shall grant registration or renewal of registration to an applicant
where in the opinion of the Director the applicant is suitable for registration and
the proposed registration is not objectionable.
The purpose of a similar section of securities legislation was considered by
the Privy Council in Lymburn v. Mayland, wherein it noted:
There is no reason to doubt that the main object sought to be secured in this
part of the Act is to secure that persons who carry on the business of dealing in
securities shall be honest and of good repute, and in this way to protect the public
from being defrauded2 8
In addition, the O.S.C. has repeatedly emphasized that registration is a repre-
sentation that the registrant "will deal fairly with the public".
2 9
Functionally, it seems obvious that a screening mechanism is necessary
for the control of access to the securities business if these objectives are to be
achieved. Thus, discretion is exercised at the outset by requiring the Director
25 For a recent and extended discussion of the relevant jurisprudence on the subject,
see D. Gifford, Decisions, Decisional Referents, and Administrative Justice (1972), 37
Law & Contemporary Prob. 3-11, and S. Wexler, Discretion: The Unacknowledged Side
of Law (1975), 25 U.T.LJ. 120.
20 S. 137 (summary conviction offence), and s. 143(1) (injunctive relief).
2 7 For a summary, see P. Dey, Exemptions Under the Securities Act of Ontario
(1972), L.S.U.C. Annual Lectures at 127.
28 [1932] A.C. 318 at 324. For other judicial interpretations of the purpose of
securities legislation in general, see Smith v. The Queen [1960] S.C.R. 776, 25 D.L.R.
(2d) 225, 128 C.C.C. 145; Gregory & Co. v. Quebec Securities Comm. [1961] S.C.R.
584, 28 D.L.R. (2d) 721; Re Ont. Sec. Comm. and Brigadoon Scotch Distributors (Can.)
Ltd., [1970] 3 O.R. 714, 14 D.L.R. (3d) 38, and more recently, Re W. D. Latimer Co.
v. Bray (1975), 6 O.R. (2d) 129, 52 D.L.R. (3d) 161; atFg. (1974) 2 O.R. (2d) 391,
43 D.L.R. (3d) 58.
29 See Goldmack Securities Corp. Jan. 1966, O.S.C.B. 14. This was affirmed with
approval in Re: Adelaide Securities Ltd., [1968] O.S.C.B. 54; and in J. McNairn and D.
Truster, [1969] O.S.C.B. 28.
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to approve all registrants, in lieu of a more simple and authoritative certifica-
tion system for applicants who meet prescribed minimum standards, to be
followed, when required, by disciplinary action.3° This task is not without
its costs in terms of time and manpower, which are derived from the large
number of registrations with which the Director and his staff must be con-
cerned on an annual basis. 31 While a significant portion of these represent
renewals or reclassifications of registration, there are still a considerable
number of new registrants to be evaluated each year.32 However, the alterna-
tive would be more burdensome, for in addition to the requirements of the
certification process, the investigation and enforcement facilities of the Com-
mission would require expansion. Protection of the investing public neces-
sitates restrictions on access to the securities business, rather than reliance
on the facilities and sanctions possessed by the Commission to enforce ac-
ceptable behaviour once a person or company is registered.
In examining the scope of the Director's discretion, it is important to note
that section 7 is phrased affirmatively. If the applicant meets the standards of
the section, the statute stipulates that the Director "shall" grant registration.
Thus, he is not delegated absolute discretion, although it is obvious that there
is a large amount of room for discretion in determining what is "suitable" and
"not objectionable?" What is not clear is the issue of the onus of proof, which
may oftentimes be instrumental in tipping the balance in favour of or against
an applicant. In practice, it appears that once the applicant has completed the
relevant forms, the task of the Director and his staff is to assess the informa-
tion and to discern any reason why the person is not suitable or the registration
is objectionable. Nevertheless, once he has made a decision, and it is chal-
lenged, the onus is clearly on the applicant to demonstrate his or her suitability.
Other sections of Part It of the Act (registration) are operative in
limiting the Director's discretion. The requirement of a hearing before registra-
tion may be refused 3s and the provision for written reasons34 are seen by
many commentators as an effective limit on an arbitrary exercise of dis-
cretion.35 However, these prerequisites concern only procedural standards
that are applicable, and fail to deal with the need for elaboration of sub-
stantive standards necessary to guide the Director and the applicant in de-
termining his or her suitability. 8
SO This preventative duty notion regarding the role of registration is illustrated in
Tuina Investments Ltd., [1968] O.S.C.B. 35.
31 In 1974, there were 4,785 registrants, compared to 5,169 in 1973, and 4,683 in
1972. These numbers are, of course, subject to the general rate of prosperity in the
securities industry, and to the fact that many are renewals or reclassifications. Source:
O.S.C.B., March 1975 at 64: Ont. Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations,
Statistical Review 1972-73.
3 2 No figures are available for new registrations of salesmen. n 1973 there were
54 new principal registrations. Source: O.S.C.B. Jan. 1973 -Dee. 1973.
3 S. 7(2).
3 S.5(5).
35 See generally, supra, note 7.
36 It has been noted that these hearings may "more closely resemble an investigation
than a hearing", with the use of hearsay evidence and at times refusal by the Commission
to disclose the source of its information: C. R. Thomson, Concepts and Procedures in
Hearings before the O.S.C. (1972), L.S.U.C. Annual Lectures at 95.
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The Director has no power to cancel or suspend any registration, as this
function is performed by the Commission.37 From the perspective of the
registrant, however, this a negligible distinction, as the O.S.C. may act under
this power with reference only to the vague standard of the "public interest'. 8
The actual registration process functions according to a scheme of
classification. Section 6 delineates four major classes that are required to be
registered for trading in securities: dealers, advisers, underwriters, and sales-
men. These main categories are defined in section 1(1), and those of dealer
and adviser are further classified into sub-categories 39 according to differences
in function and membership in recognized self-regulatory organizations.4°
Considerable amounts of information as to personal history and business
experience are elicited by requiring registrants to complete and execute forms
according to their classification. 4 ' Applications for registration as salesmen
require as well a certificate from the intended employer testifying as to the
proposed registrant's good character and reputation.4 - Salesmen also provide
three referencess4 3 to whom letters are sent by the Director's staff. After a
routine check with the police, an interview,4 4 and occasionally consultation
with relevant regulatory bodies,4 5 registration is usually granted. Having regard
to the size of staff and the number of registrations processed, the occasional
oversight can be expected.46 The emphasis on regulation of salesmen by such
requirements and the need to pass approved courses of instruction47 are
justified, it appears, by reference to the need for protection of the investing
public.
4 8
The Director is explicitly given discretion in section 7(3) to restrict a
registration by imposing terms and conditions. General conditions of registra-
n7S. 8(1).
88 See Adelaide Securities Ltd., supra, note 29 at 54; United Investment Services
Ltd. [1972], O.S.C.B. at 20-36; A.E. Ames & Co. [1972] O.S.C.B., as examples of
O.S.C. action under s. 8(1).
39 R.R.O., 1970, Reg. 794 as amended, ss. 2(1), 2(2). Regulations refer to the
consolidated regulations published in The Ontario Securities Act and Regulations 1974,
(Toronto: R. DeBoo, 1974).
40 Report of the Securities Industry Ownership Committee of the O.S.C. (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 1972) at para. 4:04.
41 R.R.O. 1970, Reg. 794, s. 3.
42 Id. s. 3 (5).
43 Id., Form 5, item 12.
44 For an explanation of the pre-registration interview procedure, see Douglas
George Murdock [May 1967] O.S.C.B. 25.
4 5 Baillie, supra, note 7 at 244, 274.
4
6 See, e.g., E. F. Loughrey, [Jan. 1967] O.S.C.B. 27 and Murdock, supra, note 44,
where in cancelling a registration for a false application, the Director noted that "applica-
tions are not delayed pending the return of routine police check", so that honest applica-
tions would not suffer by delay.
47 O.S.C. Policy 3-06.
48B. Bellmore, The Ontario Securities Commission as an Administrative Tribunal
(1967), 5 O.H.L.J. 210 at 225.
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tion are provided in the regulations 49 in an attempt to ensure that all classes
of principal registrants will have the continued ability to serve their clients.
These relate to minimum free capital requirements, bonding or insurance re-
quirements, proper maintenance of business records and accounting pro-
cedures, audit requirements and procedures, and for dealers, participation in
a compensation or contingency trust fund. The regulations require that regis-
trants must be given notice of any proposed changes in these conditions, and
that they be afforded an opportunity to be heard before the changes are ap-
proved by the Commission.50 Thus, in this specific instance of minimum con-
ditions, the Director is unable to exercise his discretion without reference
to explicit standards.
Additional discretion is allocated to the Director in Part H in that he may
require further information or material to be submitted by an applicant;51 he
must approve the new employment of salesmen upon termination of employ-
ment with a registrant,52 he may refuse registration for an insufficient period
of residency in Ontario,53 and he may recommend that a refund of the fee or
such part thereof "as he considers fair and reasonable" be made in the case
of refusal or cancellation of registration.54
2. Past Provisions
In analyzing the scope of the Director's discretion under the current Act,
it is useful to examine the development of legislative approaches to the issue
of registration.55
49 Reg. s. 6. These are provided with greater detail in Reg. ss. 6a-6e, and in O.S.C.
conditions of registration made pursuant to s. 6 of the regulations (see supra, note 39 at
appendices). It is worth noting that the Director is given discretion within these rules,
e.g. s. 6(1)(b) and s. 6(3)(a) and (b). However, it appears that conditions cannot
limit the rights of persons other than the registrants, such as their creditors; see Campbell
v. Prudential Trust Co. and Superintendant of Brokers, [1944] 3 W.W.R. 456; 3 D.L.R.
69 (B.C.C.A.).
50 R.R.O. 1970, Reg. 794 s. 6(7).
51S. 12.
52S. 6(4).
53 S. 14. See N. S. Organ, [April, 1952] O.S.C.B. at 4; S. Kellman, [Nov., 1952] at 12.
Non-resident ownership of registrants is now subject to restrictions - R.R.O. reg. 794 as
amended ss. 6(a)-6(g), O.R. 95/74. This applies only to new entrants into the investment
community, for under the "grandfather exception" (s. 6a(g)), non-resident controlled
registrants as of July 14, 1971 are permitted to continue to hold that status, subject to
certain conditions (s. 6(d) ). This follows from the Report of the Securities Ownership
Committee of the Ontario Securities Commission, supra, note 40, which rejected the com-
pulsory Canadianization of existing non-resident registrants. The Commission is delegated
the discretionary power to exempt applicants from these requirements (ss. 6(d)(3),
6(e) (3), s. 6(g) ). For cases where the O.S.C. has exercised this power see J. R. Timmons
& Co., [1971] O.S.C.B. 167; Laidlaw Securities Can. Ltd., [1973] O.S.C.B. 100. Exemptions
were denied in First Boston (Can.) Ltd., [1971] O.S.C.B. 140, and DuPont Glore Forgen
Can. Ltd., [1974] O.S.C.B. 133.
54 S. 17.
55 For a history of securities legislation generally, see J. P. Williamson, Securities
Registration in Canada, (Toronto: Butterworths, 1960) at 4-37; CCH Canadian Securi-
ties Law Reporter at 513; H. G. Emerson, "An Integrated Disclosure System for Ontario
Securities Legislation", in Ziegel, supra, note 7 at 401-412; L. Loss, Securities Regulation
(Boston: Little Brown, 1958) Vol. I, at 23-30; Loss & Cowett, supra, note 4.
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Ontario's first statute governing the field of securities was The Securities
Frauds Prevention Act of 192860 which was designed to prevent fraud and to
require registration of brokers and salesmen. Registration was automatic
within ten days of filing unless the Attorney-General objected, and he was
allowed to order that an application should or should not be granted "for any
reason which he may deem sufficient".57 This Act was consolidated in 1930
when wider grounds for suspension of registration were incorporated. 5 An
amendment in 1937 instituted the O.S.C. and allocated to it the responsibility
for registration.r0
In 1945, the first modem provincial Securities Act was established.60
The discretion of the O.S.C. was extended to the granting, denial, cancellation
or suspension of registration, and the power of registration was similar to
that of the present Act, except that the authority belonged to the Commis-
sion."' This was to remain with the O.S.C. until 1962, when the Director was
assigned the power to grant or deny registration under the same terms as he
possesses today, as well as the authority to suspend or cancel a registration if
such action was in the public interest." Thus, the Director had an even
greater discretion at that time than he now possesses. The 1966 Securities Act
granted power to him to restrict registration upon such terms and conditions
as are now applicable under section 7(3). 63
It was not until 1968 that the Director's authority to cancel registration
was transferred to the Commission. 4 Since that time, no change has occurred.
Thus, the legislative history of the registration provisions indicates that the
present day discretion exercised by the Director is substantially more restricted
than that of his predecessors. Whether this trend is to be continued in the
new Securities Act (Bill 98) is a subject that will be discussed in the con-
cluding portion of this article.
3. Other Securities Legislation
The Ontario Act is generally regarded as a model for other provinces to
follow in order to ensure a uniform legislative approach. 65 It is not surprising,
then, to find that in the provinces which have adopted similar legislation
68
the appropriate administrator has the same power that the Ontario Director
possesses under section 7(1). Although acting under different legislation, the
Registrars of the Northwest and Yukon Territories have similar authority.
67
56 S.O. 1928, c. 34.
57Md., ss. 4(1), 8(1)(a).
58 S.O. 1930, c. 39, s. 9(1).
GO S.O. 1937, c. 69, ss. 3(1), 2.
00 S.O. 1945, c. 22.
01 Id., s. 9.
02 S.O. 1962-3, c. 131, ss. 5(1), 6.
63 S.O. 1966, c. 142, s. 7(3).
64 S.O. 1968, c. 123, s. 6.
65 Williamson, supra, note 55 at 30-34.
06S.B.C. 1967, c. 45 as amended, s. 8; R.S.A. 1970, c. 333, as amended, s. 7;
R.SM. 1970, c. S-50, as amended, s. 7; S.S. 1967, c. 81, as amended, s. 7.
0 7 N. W. T. Ord., 1971, c. 17, s. 6; N. Y. T. Ord., 1970, s. 5.
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However, it is interesting to note that, with the exception of Manitoba, all
of these jurisdictions permit the administrator to cancel and suspend a registra-
tion.18 Only in Manitoba is there a two-tiered decisional process, similar to
the Ontario scheme, 69 which divides jurisdiction between denial and revocation
of registration.
To the east of Ontario, the administrator is possessed of even more
discretion. In Quebec, "the granting or renewal of registration is at the dis-
cretion of the Director". 7O In the Maritime provinces, the appropriate public
official may order that registration shall not be granted, "for any reason which
he may deem sufficient". 71 In Newfoundland, an order denying registration
is not subject to review "in any way by any court".72
It is obvious that the Director of the O.S.C., in comparison with his other
provincial counterparts, possesses a more limited scope of discretion than one
would first imagine. Historically, the legislature has tended to limit this power.
The Director has no power to cancel or suspend registration, and his discretion
may be operative only when an applicant is not suitable or if the registration
would be objectionable. This does not remove, however, the fact that there
are no standards, by statute or regulation (apart from the residency and
ownership requirements mentioned earlier) that guide the Director's determi-
nation of what is suitable or objectionable under section 7.
With this in mind, it is useful to note that in the United States the
drafters of the Uniform Securities Act have attempted to remedy a similar
situation. Under section 204(a) of that Act, the administrator has discretion
to grant, deny, suspend, or cancel registration only upon the application of a
double-standard test. To make an order denying registration, he must be
found to be within one or more specific grounds allowing such an order.
These grounds include a variety of explicit standards ranging from misleading
applications, previous convictions, dishonesty or unethical practices, to in-
solvency and incompetency. While the administrator may exercise considerable
discretion, it is structured; even if the applicant came within one of the specific
standards, the administrator must still make a finding that this order would
be in the public interest. This is not the situation in Ontario,-where the ap-
plicable standards are only discernable by examining the exercise of the
Director's discretion in specific instances.
05 Supra, notes 64, 65 - Sask. s. 8; Alta. s. 8; B.C. s. 9; N.W.T. s. 9(2); Y.T.
s. 9(2).
69 R.S.M. supra, note 66, s. 8.
70 R.S.Q. 1964, c. 274, as amended, s. 24.
71 R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 205, as amended, s. 12(1) (a) - (Secretary of the Board of
Commissioners of Public Utilities); R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 280, as amended, s. 11(1) (a) -
(Minister); R.S.P.E.I. 1951, c. 146, as amended, s. 3(5) - (Prov. Secretary); R.S.
Nfld., 1970, c. 349, s. 12(1) - (Attorney-General). The fact that political authorities
in some of these provinces have a wide power of discretion is noteworthy in comparison
to the situation in Ontario.
72S. 12(2).
73 See generally, Loss & Cowett, supra, note 4 at 272, for their model act, and the
drafters' and official comments. The Act has been adopted in some form in a majority
of the state legislatures; see Bateman, supra, note 1.
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C. SCOPE OF THE DIRECTOR'S DISCRETION: PROSPECTUSES
1. Current Provisions
Section 35(1) of the Act prohibits any person or company from trading
in a security where such trade would be in the course of a distribution to the
public until there has been filed with the Commission a prospectus for which
a final receipt has been obtained from the Director. While the Director has
no discretion with respect to the issuance of a receipt for the preliminary
prospectus required by section 35,74 his main grant of authority is found in
section 61 (1), whereby he controls the issuance of the necessary receipt for
the final prospectus. Under this section, "the Director may in his discretion
issue a receipt for any prospectus filed under this part", unless it appears to
him that paragraphs (a) to (f) of the section are applicable. These paragraphs
set out various situations, i.e., non-compliance with statutory requirements
(e.g. the "full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts" found in section
41(1)), unconscionable consideration, failure to execute an escrow agree-
ment, etc., in which it is prescribed that a receipt for a prospectus should
not issue.
The scope of this discretion may be measured in monetary terms. In
1974, the total value of accepted prospectuses amounted to nearly two billion
dollars, while in 1973 it was over one and one-half billion dollars. 75 However,
various factors tend to reduce any notion of unlimited authority. One is the
wide range of exemptions from the prohibition of trading without a prospectus
(section 35(1)), found in section 58, which incorporates by reference many
of the section 19 exemptions from registration. The importance of these ex-
emptions is reflected in pecuniary terms as well, for in 1974 the value of
private placements was slightly more than half that of the total value of
accepted prospectuses.7 6 Further evidence of restrictions on the Director's
discretion may be found in the number of section 59 applications for O.S.C.
rulings that a trade shall be deemed not to be a distribution to the public, in
order to avoid the prospectus requirement. 77
The legislative purpose of the prospectus requirements is not easily dis-
cemible. The general attitude envisages a compromise between the "full, true,
and plain disclosure" philosophy illustrated by the English and American
federal legislation, and the more discretionary "blue sky" theory which is
prevalent in American state legislation. 78 Specifically, it appears that section
61 is designed to enable the Director, in the exercise of his discretion, to
regulate substantively the content and quality of the prospectus. 79 It is only
by means of an analysis of this section and of the decisions of the Director
7 S.35(2).
75 [1975] O.S.C.B. at 63.
70 Id. For the first six months of 1975, the proportion of private placements decreased,
representing $758,493,000 out of total financing of $2,927,595,000, O.S.C.B. August 1975
at 194.
7 7 In 1974, 81 applications were made, compared with 109 in 1973. Id.
78 See Bray, supra, note 2 at 451. For a classic comparison of the conflicting philoso-
phies see L. Loss, supra, note 55 at 121-29.
70 See Baillie, supra, note 7 at 175, 223.
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that any relationship between the purpose and exercise of the discretion can
be established.
While the Director is given wide discretionary power over the acceptance
of prospectuses, one may question whether it is as broad as that which exists
in section 7. Upon a closer reading of section 61(1), it seems obvious that
the Director has no choice but to refuse to issue a receipt if any of the circum-
stances enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (f) exist.80 The Act provides fairly
specific standards to guide the Director in refusing a final prospectus, while
none are available under the registration provisions of section 7. The Legisla-
ture has apparently placed a greater priority on clarifying for capital financiers
conditions of eligibility for a final receipt for a prospectus than it has on in-
dicating to applicants for registration the parameters of what is "suitable"
and "not objectionable".
However, since the Director may, in his discretion, issue a receipt, it
seems reasonable to assume that he is not restricted, in refusing a prospectus,
to paragraphs (a) to (f), and that he is free to elaborate alternative grounds.8 '
One commentator has viewed this proposition with concern, stating that it
relates the jurisdiction of the Director to his subjective feelings, and that
it places on him the responsibility for deciding new criteria, other than the cir-
cumstances spelled out in the section, upon the basis of which to exercise his
discretion. Accordingly the Ontario Securities Commission generally assumes that
it has a discretion only as to the existence of the circumstances spelled out in
section [61] and that when no such circumstances exist the prospectus must
ordinarily be accepted for fing.
8 2
While both interpretations have their merits, it appears that the former con-
clusion is borne out by the recent decisions of the O.S.C., which will be
discussed later.
The actual forms and filing requirements for both preliminary and final
prospectuses are set out in the Act (sections 38 to 53), the regulations (sec-
80 See Emerson, supra, note 55. It is important to note the inconsistency which appears
when one compares this with s. 62. Under the latter section, if it appears that any of the
grounds set out in s. 61 exist after the filing of a prospectus and the issuance of a receipt,
then the O.S.C. may order all trading to cease, while the Director appears to have no
alternative but to refuse in these situations.
81 See Smith, supra, note 7 at 469-71 for a more detailed presentation of this point.
The Merger Study, supra, note 2, noted at para 2:05 that "through provisions such as
section 61 of the Act the Ontario Legislation provides a residual discretion. Emerson
notes that a restructured form of discretion concerning acceptance of prospectuses was
proposed in s. 15.23(1) of the Draft Canada Business Corporation Act, to be found in
R. W. Dickerson et. al., Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada
Vol. II, (Ottawa, 1972) at 139: Id., at note 51. This would limit the administrator to
a decision whether or not the statutory prohibited situations existed and any refusal would
have to be based on such circumstances. The portion of the Draft Act dealing with
prospectuses is not incorporated in the new Canada Business Corporations Act, S.C.
1974-75, c. 33 (to come into effect on proclamation). Section 186 of the Act merely
requires a company under federal jurisdiction to send to the Director a copy of any
prospectus that is filed.
82 Baillie, supra, note 7 at 220.
19751
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
tions 12 to 43, forms 13-16) and various policy statements (O.S.C. Policy
3-04, Uniform Act Policy 2-02, 2-03). These, and the procedure involved,
comprise a complicated field which has been discussed and criticized by
others.83 Generally speaking, upon filing, the prospectus will be assigned to
a review team comprised of lawyers, accountants, and other staff, to ensure
compliance with the myriad of rules and regulations. Consultation with tech-
nical experts and financial analysts may occur in the case of unusual filings,
and "deficiency" letters and more informal advice are given to issuers in an
attempt to avoid any problems concerning compliance with the Act.8 4 If the
Director does make an adverse determination under section 61, it must be
made in writing, and only after the person or company who filed the prospectus
has had a prior opportunity to be heard.85
The success of this system is reflected in the fact that in 1971 (the last
year for which figures are available), of 536 prospectuses accepted, there were
90 hearings under section 61(2) which resulted in only 5 orders being made
under either that section or section 40(1) (preliminary prospectus). 86 These
statistics lead one also to the conclusion that despite the scope of the Director's
discretion, it is rarely used to the detriment of issuers seeking to raise capital.
A detailed examination of prospectus requirements is beyond the scope
of this paper, but it is illustrative to delineate the other discretionary powers
that the Director may exercise with respect to this process. He has the au-
thority to stop the trading permitted under section 36(2) in the case of a
defective preliminary prospectus, 87 to require or permit the omission of
financial data from the prospectus, 88 or to dispense with or require certain
certificates to be filed.8 9 He has control over the designation of classes of
issuers and the requisite forms which must be filed 90 and it is specifically
stated that "no inference shall be drawn from the items of disclosure called
for by the various prospectus forms that in any way qualifies or limits the
discretion granted to the Director. .. by the Act."91
The foregoing merely illustrates the statutory extent of the Director's
discretion, and while analysis of its substantive content is necessary to gauge
the impact of its exercise, it is useful first to compare its scope with that
exercised in the past, and that which is exercised by other administrators.
83 See Bray, supra, note 2 at 427-30; Baillie, supra, note 7 at 222; Meech, supra,
note 7 at 211; and B. Lockwood, Procedures in Cross-Country Prospectus Clearance and
Regulation by Policy Statement (1972), L.S.U.C. Annual Lectures at 111.
84 For a sophisticated analysis of this type of administrative action in the U.S., see
W. J. Lockhart, SEC No-Action Letters: Informal Advice as a Discretionary Administra-
tive Clearance (1972), 32 Law & Contemp. Prob. 95.
8'S. 61(2).
8 Ontario, Annual Report of the Department of Commercial and Financial Affairs,
1971.
87S. 40(1).
88S. 43(1), 44, 45, 49.
8) S. 46(1), 50(2), 52(5).
0o R.R.O. 1970, Reg. 794, s. 12.
91 Id. s. 22(2).
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2. Past Provisions
A legislative history of section 61 is not as helpful as the examination of
section 7. No statute speaks to the issue of prospectuses until 1945, when the
Commission, in the interest of full, true and plain disclosure, was given the
same power now possessed by the Director, with the exception that paragraphs
(e) and (f) of the current section concerning trust agreements and pros-
pectuses of finance companies were not present.92 This has remained un-
changed to date, except in so far as the latter two grounds for refusal have
been added, and in that the Director has replaced the O.S.C. as the initial
statutory decision-maker.93
3. Other Securities Legislation
In comparison with other provincial securities acts, the Director's dis-
cretion under section 61(1) is not as wide as it may seem. Some provinces
make no allowance for refusal of a prospectus,9 4 and three have substantially
the same provisions as the Ontario Act.9 5 The Saskatchewan legislation pro-
vides that the Commission "may in its absolute discretion issue a receipt"
except where certain situations arise,95 while Quebec's administrator is allowed
to grant such permission where "it deems it expedient".97 In Nova Scotia and
Prince Edward Island the Registrar may suspend the effectiveness of a pros-
pectus if it is "incomplete, inaccurate or unsatisfactory".98 The widest dis-
cretion of all resides in the New Brunswick authority which may issue a
certificate if the prospectus contains and provides for "a fair, just and equit-
able plan" for the transaction of a business. The same official "shall have
absolute discretion in the granting of any certificate . . . and shall refuse to
grant such certificate if in his . . . discretion he . . . is of the opinion that it
would not be in the public interest". 99
While section 61(1) is structured to a degree by paragraphs (a) to (f),
and is not as wide or unfettered a power as that possessed in other Canadian
jurisdictions, it is still unsatisfactory when compared with its equivalent in the
Uniform Securities Act. Under Section 306 of that Act, the administrator may
deny effectiveness to a registration statement only where such an order is in
the public interest and it falls within one or more of the substantive grounds
for refusal. These include incomplete or misleading provision of information,
wilful violation of the Act, illegality of the enterprise, unreasonable amounts
of compensation, profit or options, or where the offering would work or tend
to work a fraud. The discretion is structured much more affirmatively and
explicitly than under the Ontario Act, although it must be recognized that
92 S.O. 1945, c. 22, s. 52.
93S.O. 1962-3, c. 131, s. 15(1); S.O. 1966, c. 142, s. 61(1).
9 4 Northwest and Yukon Territories.
95 B.C., Alta., Manitoba.
96S.S. 1967, c. 81, as amended, s. 68.
9 7 R.S.Q. 1964, c. 273, as amended, s. 50.
9 8 R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 280, as amended, s. 17; R.S.P.E.I. 1951, as amended, s. 11.
9 9 R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 205, as amended, s. 14. Newfoundland's Act allows its registrar
to refuse to endorse the registration statement "in any case where he deems it to be in
the public interest", s. 13(1).
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these substantive grounds for refusal are subject to a very broad and dis-
cretionary interpretation.
D. SCOPE OF THE DIRECTOR'S DISCRETION: A COMPARISON
Before turning to an examination of the substantive standards by which
the Director exercises his discretion in determining the suitability of a regis-
trant or prospectus, a brief discussion of other forms of discretion allocated
by provincial legislation is useful for comparative purposes.
For the purposes of brevity, this analysis is limited to provincial ad-
ministrators who perform a licensing function as opposed to the mere ad-
ministration of an act. It also excludes those adjudications performed by
tribunals,10 0 Ministers of the Crown,' 0 ' or the Cabinet. 0 2
Under legislation enacted prior to 1970,103 the Commercial Registration
Appeal Tribunal was established to supervise the registration and conduct of
people engaged in various occupations. Separate specific Acts govern each
occupation, but since they follow a uniform pattern, it is useful to illustrate
the general process of registration and the discretion allocated to the appro-
priate administrator. Each Act appoints a registrar and requires registration
as a condition for carrying on the business of a real estate or business broker,
collection agent, mortgage broker, car dealer, itinerant salesman, upholstered
or stuffed article manufacturer, or a wholesale distributor of paperback or
periodical literature.
04
The legislation avoids the problem of discretion discussed under section
61(1) of the Securities Act, in that all applicants are entitled as of right to a
licence unless the applicant's financial position is such that he cannot reason-
ably be expected to be financially responsible, or if his past conduct affords
reasonable grounds for the belief that he will not carry on business in accord-
ance with law and integrity.10 5 Thus, there is no discretion to refuse a licence
unless the specific grounds exist, and the onus is clearly on the administrator
to justify a refusal by reference only to these statutory standards. This does
not avoid the problem, however, that the standards as to financial responsi-
bility and business integrity are just as vague as those in section 7 of The
Securities Act.
In other areas, administrative discretion is quite circumscribed or non-
existent. Statutes may provide that upon completion of a prescribed form and
100 E.g. Private Hospitals Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 361, s. 3(1) - licence granted by
the Ontario Hospital Services Commission.
101 E.g. Nursing Homes Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 302, s. 5.
102 E.g. Private Sanitaria Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 363, s. 2(4).
103 Department of Financial and Commercial Affairs Act, S.O. 1968-69, c. 25.
104 Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 401; Collection Agencies
Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 71; Mortgage Brokers Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 278; Motor Vehicle
Dealers Act, S.O. 1971, c. 21; Consumer Protection Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 82; Upholstered
and Stuffed Articles Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 474; Paperback and Periodical Distributors Act,
S.O. 1971, c. 82.
105 See e.g., Consumer Protection Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 82, s. 5(1).
[VOL. 13, NO. 3
Securities Commission
the payment of a fee, registration shall be granted. 10 6 Other legislation, how-
ever, is more discretionary, in that registration may be refused if it would be
"against the public interest",' 07 or if it is unsuitable and the applicant is not
"of good character". 0 8 Not surprisingly, the situations in which the broadest
possible discretion is conferred are those relating to matters of health and
safety. In these occupational fields, the director or registrar may refuse to
issue a licence "for any reason that he considers proper". 0 9
In summary, it seems that the discretion of the Director of the O.S.C. is not
as broad as one would think if it is placed within the overall regulatory frame-
work of the province. By itself, it may appear to be of substantial scope, yet
in an historical and comparative context it occupies a moderate position with
regard to its nature and scope. However, it does represent a problem in that
few substantive standards have been made explicit in an effort to guide this
discretion. What follows is a discussion of how the Director has exercised his
discretion, the relationship between this and the purpose of the discretion, and
how, if at all, it can be better structured in the public interest.
E. EXERCISE OF THE DIRECTOR'S DISCRETION
1. Registration
It has been noted in the preceding discussion that the purpose of the
registration requirements and conditions is to ensure that those engaged in the
securities industry are of sufficient solvency and competence to create and
maintain public confidence in the capital markets. The statutory power of
registration is discretionary and need have reference only to vague standards
of suitability. Not surprisingly, this creates difficulties for those seeking regis-
tration, for although a considerable amount of procedure and policy is based
upon comparatively few provisions of The Securities Act, one of the greatest
difficulties facing an applicant is the general lack of publicity given to ad-
ministrative policy." 0
Neither the statute, regulations, nor the policy statements give any sub-
stantive clue as to what is encompassed within the meaning of section 7.
Naturally, if an applicant is found to be in contravention of a statutory con-
dition such as the maintenance of minimum free capital, or of an explicit
policy, such as dual registration, refusal of registration can be expected."'
106 See e.g., Mining Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 274, s. 25; Operating Engineers Act, R.S.O.
1970, c. 333, s. 7(1).
107 See e.g., Private Investigators and Security Guards Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 362,
s. 8(1).
'08 See e.g., Maternity Boarding Houses Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 264, s. 5.
10 9 See e.g., Dead Animal Disposal Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 105, C. 5(2); Meat Inspec-
tion Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 266, s. 3(2).
110 Williamson, supra, note 54 at 245.
111 See e.g., Fisher-Johnson Management Ltd. [1968] O.S.C.B. 138. The cases that
are discussed infra are not always those of the Director per se. Several are decisions of
the O.S.C. in which decisions of the Director are reviewed. I am indebted to N. M.
Chorney's published Index to Canadian Securities Cases 1949-1974 (Toronto: Law
Society of Upper Canada, 1975) which proved to be an invaluable aid in sifting through
the decisions of the Commission and Director over the past two and a half decades.
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Occasionally conditions will be imposed that are referable to a specific policy.
Thus a professional football player was granted a renewal of registration on
the condition that it be suspended during the football season."1 Registration
was deemed to require his full time attention, and it was felt that the demands
placed on a professional athlete detracted from the standards set out in Com-
mission policy on the registration of part-time salesman.113 The conclusion
that can be drawn from this type of case is that where there are regulations or
policies that are explicit, the Director will normally feel that he is bound by
the declared policy, even if that policy is found to be lacking in merits or
practicability."
4
The contentious issue that remains is the nature of the non-explicit stand-
ards that guide the Director's discretion in determining the suitability of an
applicant. For the purposes of this discussion, it is necessary to regard those
decisions which involve a denial of registration as opposed to its suspension
or cancellation. Our emphasis is on the Director's control of access to an
occupation, and not on the Commission's control of conduct once one is
registered. An analysis of the many Commission decisions would undoubtedly
be of benefit in determining what standards guide its interpretation of the
public interest as a ground for revocation. This analysis could then be com-
pared with the Director's decisions granting or refusing renewal of registration,
yet that is beyond the scope of this paper. Besides, rarely does it seem that
the Director refuses renewal, as that function is usually performed by the O.S.C.
when it considers "fitness for continued registration". 115 The Commission, and
the securities industry, in its own self-interest, are both concerned with the
conduct of those engaged in the occupation. Yet rarely is attention drawn to
the important question of access to the securities business and the benefits
accruing therefrom.
Past conduct in securities transactions is undoubtedly a factor in the
decision of the Director of whether to grant registration. Often this occurs
when a salesman's registration is terminated by a change in employers'" and
he applies for the transfer of that registration to another principal registrant.
The consequences of a refusal by the Director are of significant impact, as they
effectively bar the salesman from future employment in the business.
Two decisions are of particular interest. In James Jeffrey Forsythe,"7 a
salesman had lost his registration by operation of section 6(4) through no
fault of his own. However, his application for transfer of registration was
refused. The Director found that Forsythe had engaged in a violation of The
112 Michael Edward Blum, [1971] O.S.C.B. 18.
113 O.S.C. Policy 3-07. For other decisions where part-time employment registrants
are discussed, see Paul John Rockel [July-August 1966] O.S.C.B. at 6; William Trewin
[November 1965] O.S.C.B. 12.
114 [R. J. Hodgson & Co. Ltd.] (1969) O.S.C.B. 190. See infra in the text at F. I(i)
for a discussion of the O.S.C. review of this decision which, in effect, amended the policy
which the Director felt was binding on him.
"';See e.g., United Investment Services Ltd., supra, note 38 at 20-31; and A. E.
Ames & Co., supra, note 38.
11GS. 6(4).
117 [1972] O.S.C.B. 167.
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Securities Act by obtaining subscriptions for shares of a private company, by
whom he was employed, from several acquaintances and friends. The Director
reviewed Forsythe's past conduct in the securities business and found it want-
ing in three respects: an unsteady employment record, failure to disclose
motor vehicle convictions, and a previous incident concerning the misleading
placement of trading orders for speculative mining shares on behalf of clients,
for which he had been subjected to Toronto Stock Exchange disciplinary hear-
ings. It was felt that, taken separately, these incidents might not have resulted
in refusal of registration, yet the cumulative effect was an impression of in-
difference, on Forsythe's behalf, towards his obligations and responsibilities.
On these grounds it was held that he was not suitable for registration. One
may seriously question whether these grounds were really relevant at all, as
past traffic violations cannot be reasonably related to one's suitability to sell
securities, nor should Forsythe have been penalized again for an event for
which he had been previously disciplined. Had the Director wished to rely on
a more established ground for refusal of the application, he could have easily
made reference to the numerous decisions in which a failure to disclose
previous convictions was sufficient to sustain a denial of registration. 18
In another similar situation,119 registration was refused to a salesman
when his employer had voluntarily given up its registration pending an in-
vestigation of it by the O.S.C. Refusal was made on the grounds that the sales-
man had taken part in an unqualified primary distribution of securities, and
had engaged in deceptive and manipulative practices. He had participated in
a two-priced offering of unqualified securities, relying on assurances of its
validity by his superiors, and thinking that a non-solicitation letter initiated by
himself would obviate the need for a prospectus. As a result of his reliance
and, no doubt, his naivet6 as to the nature of the transaction, he was barred
from future employment by the Director. 20
Other cases that deal with past conduct in the securities field as a grounds
for denial of registration are more clear cut. Thus, when the principal of an
" 8 See e.g., Frank Leslie Seaborne, [Nov. 1965] O.S.C.B. 25, Leslie John Mann, [Sept.
1966] O.S.C.B. 13, Edward Francis Loughrey, [Jan. 1967] O.S.C.B. 27, Michael Thomas,
[1972] O.S.C.B. 118. This does not apply only with respect to past criminal convictions
which in themselves would bar registration (Lawrence Sokoloff, [July-August 1966]
O.S.C.B. 11), but also to situations where the applicant has forgotten past offences com-
mitted while a youth (Dallas Lee Brown [Sept. 1966] O.S.C.B. 11), where he did not
disclose that charges not resulting in conviction were laid against him (Norman Hebscher,
[Dec. 1950] O.S.C.B.; Peter Gizewski, [July-August 1965] O.S.C.B. 15), or where previous
employment or refusal of registration remained undisclosed (Howard Henderson, [July-
August 1961] O.S.C.B. 1, 10 at 12; Ben Raber, [Nov. 1955] O.S.C.B. 33).
Obviously, the Director is concerned with the honesty of the applicant, which is the
reason why any false information is usually treated as a reason for refusal (see e.g.,
Allen Joseph Long, [Oct. 1965] O.S.C.B. 9) and a lack of frankness and candour con-
cerning previous activities and convictions is suspect (William Bruce Brown, [March 1965]
O.S.C.B. 6). One of the reasons given for the interviewing of salesmen applicants before
the registration is that it helps to ensure that there will be no misunderstanding concern-
ing the information re past convictions that is required on the application form: see
Richard William Eastcott, [Sept. 1965] O.S.C.B. 10.
"9 Frederick W. Webb, [1972] O.S.C.B. 220.
120 For the Commission's resolution of the dispute, see infra, text at F-I(i).
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applicant company was subject to a preliminary injunction issued by the
American Securities and Exchange Commission, the Director relied on the
evidence and findings in that action to refuse registration. 12 In another case,
where previous misconduct by the control person of an applicant had resulted
in a denial of exemptions and a stop order concerning shares of a mining
company in which he was involved, registration was refused.' Oblique refer-
ence was made by analogy to section 9, the inference being that since no
material circumstances had changed, "further" application for registration was
not to be allowed. This form of reasoning militates against the onus placed
upon the Director, in section 7, in that he "shall" grant registration if the
applicant is suitable. In effect, rather than the Director showing the unsuit-
ability of the applicant, the would-be registrant had to affirm its suitability,
and prove that it was "not objectionable".'2
A less certain ground for denial that is occasionally enunciated is the lack
of competence or financial responsibility. As a matter of principle, an undis-
charged bankrupt is not adjudged to be a suitable person to deal with and
advise the public.12 4 Other cases have refused registration or renewal on the
basis of the applicant's ignorance of the securities business,2 5 although this is
now largely remedied by the educational requirements for registration of sales-
men.120 Registration as a securities adviser was denied when the applicant was
unable to comprehend or answer questions relating to an engineer's report.
27
These decisions show that suitability encompasses not only the general char-
acter of the applicant, but also his or its demonstrated technical and financial
competence.
The most vague decisions are those that assess suitability for registration
on the basis of general character, reputation or business ethics. While this
necessarily entails examination of the past conduct of the applicant, it is not
restricted to the securities field. Several cases are illustrative of this approach.
Each is also instrumental in revealing how the Director and the O.S.C. have no
qualms about going beyond the corporate structure of the applicant and
examining the conduct and character of its principals.
2 t Larenim Securities Ltd. [1971], O.S.C.B. 12.
122 Harrons Developments Ltd. (Nov. 1967) O.S.C.B. 75.
1-3 Nevertheless, several decisions clearly indicate that the onus is placed upon the
applicant to affirm his suitability: see Frederick William Jackson (June 1965) O.S.C.B.
2; David Joseph Scanlon (July-August 1965) O.S.C.B. 13; Percy Brand (March 1964)
O.S.C.B. 6. For decisions that deal generally with the grounds upon which reinstatement
or re-application will be allowed, see Harry Price (June 1964) O.S.C.B. 3, and Northern
Securities Company (May 1964) O.S.C.B. 1.
124 Ronald Nudds, (April 1967) O.S.C.B. 16.
125 David L. Rotenberg (Sept. 1967) O.S.C.B. 28; J. F. Simard Co., [May 19671
O.S.C.B. 8; William Bruce Fyles, [May 19651 O.S.C.B. 5. Where registration was refused
on the grounds of the applicant's lack of knowledge (rather than lack of character), it
has been decided that the refusal does not prohibit re-application once sufficient knowl-
edge has been obtained: see Edward Mervin, (June 1965) O.S.C.B. 5.
26 Supra, note 47. Registration is occasionally suspended for salesmen where
knowledge and competence fall below a minimum standard until they pass the Canadian
Securities Course: see Wiliam Ritchie Williamson [1971] O.S.C.B. 135.
127 J. Osheroff (Dec. 1952), O.S.C.B. 12.
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In Mars Investments Ltd.,128 an application for registration as an under-
writer was refused. The Director was quite honest in stating that he knew of
no guidelines that had evolved to help him in determining registration of this
class of registrants, so that his approach would be founded on his understand-
ing of the general intent of the legislation, and on the application of 'normal'
standards. This suggests that the Director is not hostile to the idea of the
elaboration of specific standards to guide him in the exercise of his discretion.
At issue in this case was the fact that the principal of the applicant pos-
sessed a history of involvement in a number of mining companies as a pro-
moter as well as the control of two underwriting firms. Registration was re-
fused because of the appearance of a conflict of interest between his position
as an underwriter and an insider of the companies, the implication being that
this could possibly work to the detriment of the companies' shareholders. No
evidence was adduced regarding any dishonesty, illegality or misleading prac-
tices, nor was there any finding of such by the Director. Some of the companies
with which the principal was associated had been under investigation, but no
charges had been filed. The evidence, other than that of his corporate involve-
ment, went solely to reputation, as normal inquiries by Commission staff had
revealed a negative reaction by the financial community to the applicant. This
was confirmed by the principal himself on review, when he admitted his repu-
tation as a "sharp operator" resulted from his "staying away from those people
who make you a good fellow on Bay Street." 129
The Maris decision represents clearly the application of arbitrary stand-
ards by the Director in his determination of the applicant's suitability. Al-
though this was reversed by the O.S.C. on review, and although the Director
could have narrowed his decision to the conflict of interest holding, the de-
cision reflects an inconsistency between the purpose and exercise of his dis-
cretion. If the purpose of registration is the protection of the public investor
and the regulation of the securities industry, it is hard to reconcile with a
decision that implicitly seeks to protect the financial community from people
whom it regards as dangerous. It is also difficult to reconcile this decision with
cases wherein evidence indicating questionable conduct, inadequate and mis-
leading documentation of accounts, and use of brokerage facilities to maintain
the appearance of public activity in trading, was held to fall short of fraud and
that therefore no action was necessary on the part of the Director.180
In Tuina Enterprises Ltd.,18 ' registration as an underwriter was refused
after an examination of the applicant's control person's business life for nine
128 [1968] O.S.C.B. 79.
129Id. at 80.
13O E. T. Lynch & Co. (1968), O.S.C.B. 164. See also Re Larrimore Securities Ltd.
(1956), 4 D.L.R. (2d) 727 (Ont. C.A.), where, on appeal, a decision was reversed
because registration had been refused because the applicant had been refused membership
in the Broker-Dealers Association of Ontario. The decision of the Commission in Maris is
much closer to the common-sense principle elaborated in David Scanlon [July-August
1965] O.S.C.B. 13, namely that the good character of the applicant may normally be
assumed unless an unacceptable standard of business morality has been established.
181 [1968] O.S.C.B. 35.
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years revealed that he was "a man who, when occasion demands, is likely to
be loose with his words, to show a good deal less than strict regard for the
truth, or to fall short in other ways of the standards required by proper
business ethics".
The examination of past business conduct was deemed to be necessary
in assessing suitability, and it stressed three particular incidents in which the
principal was responsible for the dissemination of misleading information.
Each instance by itself was declared to be insufficient as a grounds for refusal,
yet it was felt that they represented a pattern which indicated that he was "a
man who does not see clearly enough the line that divides proper from im-
proper business conduct". It was on this basis that registration was refused.
The decision of the Director in Sigma Securities Ltd.,'1 raises a corollary
point concerning reputation and business ethics as general grounds for refusal.
Again, registration as an underwriter was refused in that the principal involved
had, during the speculation surrounding the Windfall Mines case, bought
shares in that company, and upon their subsequent decrease in price had al-
located the loss to several public companies which he controlled or in which
he possessed an interest. The principal had authority to speculate with the
funds of at least some of the companies, yet the Director was concerned with
the sinister implication of the facts. Registration was refused because he felt
the applicant had clearly demonstrated his "inability to deal fairly and ethical-
ly" with the public companies with which he was involved. This finding was
made even though it was accepted that the applicant's conduct was no different
than that of the part of the financial community within which he operated.
One cannot, nor should one, categorize each and every specific ground
for refusal of registration. This is amply demonstrated by the cases in which
the Director has resorted to varying standards and has attached differing
weights to the applicable standards. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the
discretion of the Director has been circumscribed to some extent by statute,
regulation, or policy, his decisions have exhibited a pattern of decision-making
which is free from any fixed, explicit standards that might otherwise be ap-
plicable. While some discretion is necessary for proper administration of the
Act, in order that the integrity of the decisional process be preserved it is
necessary for him to make his objectives and applicable standards as com-
pletely explicit as possible. Otherwise, it is suggested, the exercise of his dis-
cretion may be influenced or even dictated by considerations that are alien to
the purposes for which the discretionary powers were originally conferred. The
problem, as Wexler reminds us, is not so much the existence of the discretion,
but the manner in which it is exercised.' 33
2. Prospectus
It has been suggested above that the purpose of section 61(1) is to
enable the Director to regulate substantively access to the capital markets of
182 [19681 O.S.C.B. 94.
'83 Supra, note 25 at 173.
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this province. This observation must be tempered by the fact that due to the
wide range of available exemptions from prospectus requirements, and the
very small numbers of orders actually made under this section, it seems that in
practice there is little real concern about the extent of potential power exercis-
able by the Director. However, even its occasional exercise brings into focus
the conflict between the permissible extent of governmental regulation of
business affairs in the public interest and the possible effect of depriving the
economy of a productive enterprise that failed at the outset because of ad-
ministrative interference.
In its Bulletin of September 1972, the Commission noted that "under
section 61 (1) the Director has discretion in a proper case to refuse to issue"
a receipt for a prospectus (emphasis added). An analysis of several decisions
made pursuant to the section is helpful in illustrating the Director's view of a
proper case for refusal.
In most of the reported cases, a final receipt was refused because one of
the situations described in paragraphs (a) to (f) of section 61(1) existed.
Thus, a prospectus which fails to comply substantially with the requirements
of the Act or regulations, 134 which is misleading,135 or which conceals or
omits material facts necessary in order to make the prospectus not mislead-
ing,13 6 will be refused.
In Prima Mining and Metal Co., 37 a prospectus was refused because the
vendor-promoter's consideration was considered to be excessive, contrary to
section 61 (1) (b). The decision is exemplary in that it makes explicit the tests
utilized by the Director in determining: (a) when the administrator will ex-
amine a bargain between a company and a promoter to see if the section is
applicable, and (b) what factors are relevant in deciding that the consideration
paid is excessive. While one may disagree with the content of the applicable
tests, the exercise of the Director's discretion was made by reference to readily
discernible standards, although it required a disputed situation to arise before
they could be elaborated.
In two other decisions, 38 receipts were not issued because it was felt that
the proceeds of the sale of the securities, together with the resources of the
company, would be insufficient to meet the stated purposes of the prospectus
(section 61 (1) (c)). Yet these decisions involved the Director in more than
mere determinations of the sufficiency of resources, apart from the fact that
sufficiency is a relative term capable of varying value judgments. While in
both cases the available proceeds and resources would have been undoubtedly
134S. 61 (1) (a) (i): see e.g. Royal Trust Managed Funds, [1975] O.S.C.B. 132
(multiple prospectuses).
135S. 61(1) (a) (ii): see e.g. Great Divide Exploration Ltd. (July-August 1965)
O.S.C.B. 10.
136 S. 61(1) (a) (iii): see Medallion Mines Ltd., [Sept. 1965] O.S.C.B, 12; M & M
Porcupine Gold Mines Ltd. [Dec. 1965] O.S.C.B. 9.
17 [October, 1966] O.S.C.B. 15.
'38 St. Anthony Mines Ltd. [Oct. 1966] O.S.C33. 23; Arrow Petroleum Ltd. & Mc-
Manus Motors Ltd., [May 1967] O.S.C.B. 21. See also Medallion Mines [Sept. 1965]
O.S.C.B. 12.
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insufficient, the Director went beyond the literal words of the section and ex-
amined the substantive content of the proposed financings. He found that they
both involved too much investor risk in proportion to the actual equity con-
tribution of the promoters. Put in other terms, the potential profits of the ap-
plicants were considered to be unconscionable in relation to the risk that the
public investors were asked to assume. Without reference to or elaboration
of any policy governing this type of situation, the Director switched from the
application of statutory quantum standards to discretionary merit ones.
The most contentious decisions involve a refusal by the Director in situa-
tions other than those outlined in section 61 (1). We have noted above that a
clear understanding of the interpretation of section 61(1) is difficult. The
Legislature has conferred a discretion upon the Director, and has specified
certain circumstances in which it must be exercised in a prescribed manner.
Apart from this, however, there are no guidelines to assist the Director or
those filing prospectuses. Mr. Justice Kelly, in his Windfall Mines Ltd. Report,
adequately summarized the situation:
In the absence of a clear delineation of its purposes, responsibilities and powers,
over the years, the Securities Commission has, by administrative practice, estab-
lished a workable control over the issue of securities of those companies required
by the Securities Act to file prospectuses. This has been accomplished by a self-
conferred extension of the power exercisable . .. to reject prospectuses.' s 9
In one case, a prospectus was refused because the proposed issuer's name
was so similar to that of another that it was felt that the investing public might
be confused.1 40 However, like the Prima Mining decision, this was decided
consistently with a proper exercise of discretion. All the factors that were
considered, i.e. the distinctiveness of the names, and the extent to which they
had become known, the length of time the names had been used, the nature
of the business, etc., were made explicit, so that in the future, at least, any
applicant would be able to be apprised of the relevant standards that would
govern the situation.
Two cases show the extent to which the Director, in the exercise of his
discretion, is prepared to proceed in regulating the substantive content of
businesses that wish to raise capital funds in Ontario. In United Security
Fund,'41 a prospectus receipt was refused because the declared intention of
the company's management was the use of up to one-third of its assets to
purchase government-insured, mortgage-backed securities. It was held that
such an investment policy was inconsistent with what the perceived principles
of mutual funds were felt to be, namely, diversification and liquidity. Because
130 Report of the Royal Commission to Investigate Trading in the Shares of Windfall
Oils and Mines Ltd. (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1965) at 95 (emphasis added). This
was acknowledged by the Commission itself in Great Pine Mines Ltd. [Feb. 1966]
O.S.C.B. 7 at 10; where it noted "that the Legislature having failed to specify the grounds
upon which the director could and the grounds upon which he could not exercise what
is on its face an unfettered discretion to refuse to accept a prospectus, the Commission
has, lacking the guidance of the Legislature, been forced to work out those grounds
for itself'.
140 Japan Fund of Canada Ltd., [1970] O.S.C.B. 138.
141 [1971] O.S.C.B. 133.
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diversification was lacking in the expressed intent of the company's investment
policy, it was decided that it was not in the public interest to accept the
prospectus. While the decision may reflect an approach towards proper in-
vestment policy for mutual funds, it is inconsistent with the Commission's
statutory policy of full, true and plain disclosure, in that it offers no incentive
to company management to disclose their true corporate purposes.
A similar arbitrary decision is found in the case of Shopper's Investment
Ltd.142 There, the proposed prospectus of a residential mortgage finance com-
pany was refused on the ground that the security held by a trustee under a
trust agreement for debenture holders of the company was insufficient in rela-
tion to the risks inherent in mortgage financing. This was decided despite ex-
pert evidence that the mortgages were sound investments with no problems of
foreclosure or collection of payments. Also ignored were the claims by the
company that it had and was planning to inject new equity into the company,
that the debenture trust deed did not allow for the redemption or reduction
of capital without the approval of the debenture holders, and that such a re-
quirement as proposed by the Director (increased security) would so reduce
the profit margin that the businesses would be unfit to continue.
A closer examination of the reasons of the Director is in order. It is clear
that the prospectus did not fall within any of paragraphs (a) to (f) in section
61(1). The only possibility for refusal on those grounds is found in section
61 (1) (f) (ii), which requires refusal only if the securities offered by a finance
company "are not secured in such manner, on such terms and by such means
as are required by the regulations". Nowhere in the regulations nor in any
policy statement is there any requirement for a fixed percentage of security
to be held.
The only conclusion that can be drawn from these cases is that the
Director, in exercising his discretion under section 61(1), is not limited to
those situations described in the section as proper grounds for refusal. This
broad reading of his discretion is consistent with the statutory analysis of the
section offered earlier in this paper. It is also clear that whatever might have
been the legislative purpose of section 61, it has been interpreted by the
Director as encompassing substantive regulation of security issuers. Since the
Director is free to refuse or accept a prospectus, except in the limited statutory
situations, his decision will necessarily reflect a choice of policy. What subjects
the above-named decisions to criticism is the fact not that the policies reflected
in the decision were without merit, but simply that they were not made explicit.
Two recent decisions in which the Commission has reviewed the Direc-
tor's refusal of a prospectus add strength to the above argument. In Royal
Trust Managed Funds1 43 the Director declined to accept a multiple prospectus
which would enable the applicant to continue distribution of three mutual
funds. In the past, mutual funds under common sponsorship and management,
although each possessing status as a separate legal entity, were allowed to be
142 [1972] O.S.C.B. 215.
143 Supra, note 127.
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qualified by a multiple prospectus. In September of 1974, the Commission
announced a policy that would prevent the intermingling of issues, but in
deference to those who had relied on past practice, it indicated that the policy
would not be enforced until January of 1975.
After examining the three funds, the Commission was of the opinion that
the multiple prospectus should be refused on the statutory ground that it did
not meet the requirements of the Act (section 61(1) (a) (i)), in that it did
not contain adequate disclosure of the separate and distinct purposes and in-
vestment powers of each mutual fund. But the Commission went beyond this,
and indicated that:
If we are in error in finding that multiple prospectuses do not meet the require-
ments of the Act we nevertheless think that there are enough differences in these
funds to warrant the Director exercising his discretion and requiring separate
prospectuses.144
This explicit recognition of the residual discretion of the Director to
refuse a prospectus on non-statutory grounds is also contained in the Com-
mission's decision in Galaxy Goldmines Limited.145 The Director had refused
to accept the applicant company's prospectus on the ground that insufficient
effort had been expended on several unpatented mining claims possessed by
the applicant to ascertain if they merited the solicitation of public investment
monies in order that an exploration programme contained in the prospectus
might be carried out. He felt that the public investors were being asked to
assume most, if not all, of the risk inherent in such a scheme, in return for
which the vendor-promoters were assured an immediate and substantial profit.
In reviewing the Director's decision, the Commission felt that refusal of
the prospectus would be properly based on the unconscionable consideration
that would be given to the promoters. Instead of restricting the Director to the
express statutory grounds of refusal, however, the Commission noted with
benign approval that he had "exercised his residual discretion... he found
that it was against the public interest to permit an offering to the public". 146
Not only did the O.S.C. introduce a new, non-statutory ground for re-
fusing a prospectus, it also exhibited a near-cavalier attitude to the applicant's
indignant complaint that the Director "was applying a new and unwritten
policy". While acknowledging that no written policy existed, it nevertheless
indicated that the applicant was expected to be aware of such a circumstance:
The Commission has not developed any new published policies but we are pleased
to see that [the Director] has taken note, as perhaps [the applicant] has not, of
the concerns expressed by the Commission particularly during the course of the
recent hearing into the activities of Herbert Securities Ltd. . . . [The applicant]
has complained of the lack of guidelines. The Commission is in the process of
re-considering its past thinking.147
The crucial point is that neither of the interested parties in this issue are
144 ld. at 138.
145 (19751 O.S.C.B. 57.
146 Id. at 60.
14 Id.
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protected nor served by this type of decision-making. A traditional view would
argue that the issuer is being harmed in that it has no guidelines upon which to
base its investment and capital-acquisition decisions. Yet it is necessary to
remember that the public interest is ostensibly represented by the Director. It
is in the interest of accountability to the public that policy governing the
capital structure of the economy is openly elaborated and subjected to scrutiny.
It is important, in discussing the Director's discretion, that one is aware
of the relative implications of the application of a "merit standard" philosophy
to the acceptance of a prospectus.148 By this term we refer only to those cases
in which a decision is based on non-statutory grounds, such as in Shoppers
Investments Ltd., which imply that an administrative evaluation is made of
the merits and risks inherent in the proposed offering. Many criticize the
validity of a regulatory approach that incorporates a broad power of dis-
cretion, and several disadvantages are often put forth.
To a large extent the success of a merit standard approach is dependent
upon the competence and reliability of the Director and his staff. If emphasis
is to be placed on detailed analysis of merit content, then it is argued that there
can be little chance for the effective detection or restraint of illegal or fraudu-
lent offerings. Put in other terms the discretion of the regulatory process would
be centered upon determining the potentiality of success and not in the pre-
vention of fraud, the result being a regulatory morass that would not give
protection where it is most needed. 149
Related to this point is the argument that if the Director is required to
perform the very technical and complicated task of assessing the particular
merits of a financial proposal, he is susceptible to errors of judgment in his
assessment of potential risk and gain. Investment decisions are motivated by
a variety of objectives, and it is argued that it is unreasonable to expect an
administrator to determine matters such as a common denominator ratio of
risk and reward. Practically speaking, although there may be explicit repre-
sentation to the contrary, 150 there will undoubtedly arise in the mind of the
investor the impression that a prospectus approved by the Director has the
"stamp of validity.., it would not otherwise have".' 5 '
It also appears that such an approach will only lead to greater pressure
for increased statutory exemptions in an attempt to avoid the rigours of ad-
ministrative examination. In that this could possibly occur, the whole purpose
of the discretionary power is lost.
American commentators have argued that the original "blue sky" laws,
in which the Ontario legislation finds its roots, have outgrown the historic
148 For a general discussion of the disadvantages, see Bateman, supra, note 1 at
766-79; and H. S. Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regulation and the Theory of Overkill (1969),
15 Wayne L. R. 1447. For an opposing viewpoint, see J. F. Hueni, Application of Merit
Requirements in State Securities Regulation (1969), 15 Wayne L. R. 1417.
1
49 Bloomenthal, id. at 1481, Bateman, id. at 476.
150 See National Policy Statement No. 13; s. 77 Securities Act.
151 Baillie, supra, note 7 at 192.
19751
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
rationale of their origin. This analysis attributes the discretionary statutes to
populist economic philosophy which had evolved to protect western agrarian
interests from exploitation by the eastern financial capitals in a time of federal
abeyance of legislative initiative. With the development of federal true dis-
closure requirements, it is argued that the necessity for a wide discretion in
assessing prospectuses has vanished. 152
The strongest arguments against this form of regulation are found in two
related concepts. The first is one which seeks to stop the extension of paternal-
istic governmental regulation of an individual's economic right to access to the
capital markets. The uncertain and ill-defined limits of authority, and the awe-
some control over the flow of investment capital according to an administra-
tor's perception of the public interest is seen by one noted commentator as
"overkill" which lacks rationality and seeks to undercut the economic purposes
of securities legislation. 53 This view advocates that the rationality of the
market place is superior to that of an administrator.
154
A more sophisticated analysis examines the economic impact of the merit
standard approach. 55 The conclusion drawn from it suggests that the discre-
tionary format may result in important and often dangerous economic conse-
quences concerning the development of new enterprises. Substantive regulation
of prospectuses, it is claimed, places limitations on the financing of new busi-
nesses, the retention of promoter control, and the ultimate capitalist objective
of sufficent justification for economic entrepreneurship. More to the point, the
merit standard theory is attacked because it results "in a clear tendency to dis-
criminate against new enterprises in favour of older, established business",'5 6
and thus can be instrumental in the restraint of potential competition.
The proponents of the merit standard approach 157 contend that mere re-
liance on disclosure underestimates the economic self-interest of promoters
and issuers, and places too much emphasis on the competence of the average
investor to fully appreciate the implications of the complicated material found
in a prospectus. Rather than stressing the vagaries of administrative decision-
making, their concern is with the ability of the investor to make rational invest-
ment decisions. The discretionary approach is seen to be neither unnecessary,
out-dated, nor paternalistic. More to the point, it is suggested that the intel-
ligent exercise of discretion is required if a more realistic attitude is to evolve
concerning the need to balance the interests of the security industry, which
152 Bateman, supra, note 1 at 776; Loss, supra, note 55 at 27; Loss & Cowett, supra,
note 4 at 7-10.158 Bloomenthal, supra, note 148 at 1493.
154 J. Mofsky, Blue Sky Restrictions on New Business Promotions (1969), Duke
L. J. 273 at 286.
155 On this topic, see generally Mofsky, id. State Securities Regulation and New
Promotions: A Case Study (1969), 15 Wayne L. R. 1401; Adverse Consequences of Blue
Sky Regulation of Public Offering Expenses (1972) Wise. L. R. 1010.
156 Bateman, supra, note 1 at 778.
157 See generally, Hueni, supra, note 148 and H. Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants,
Some Myths, and Some Realities (1970), 45 N.Y.U.L.R. 1151.
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because of its dependence on the steady flow of capital cannot claim to be a
fully disinterested party, against those of the public.
It seems that the Ontario practice represents somewhat of a balance
between these two positions. The adverse implications of the discretion allo-
cated to the Director are no doubt existent in theory, yet practice to date has
shown that the arbitrary imposition of merit standards occurs only occasion-
ally.158 Evasion of meritorious evaluation can be accomplished by the use of
the exemptions available. Protection from administrative abuse of power can
be afforded by the elaboration of equitable and reasonable standards that can
be applied consistently, and which will not impede unduly the participants in
the capital market structure, yet which will enable the administration to be
accountable to the public for its policies and decisions.
An analysis of the nature, scope and exercise of the Director's discretion-
ary power over registration and prospectuses leads one to the conclusion that
there exists a lack of coherence in the regulation of securities in this province.
There is no clear consistency between the legislative intent of The Securities
Act and the administrative interpretation of its purpose and powers. In a
broader context, there is no assurance that the policies currently formulated
and implemented by the O.S.C., with their significant economic impact, are
not at variance with other public policies of the government. This is largely the
result of a failure to make applicable substantive standards that govern de-
cision-making completely explicit. How the exercise of the Director's discre-
tion and its consequences can best be made to conform to reasonable guide-
lines is the subject of the remainder of this article.
F. FORMAL CONTROL OF DISCRETION
In seeking methods by which discretion may be structured, it is important
to be aware of several general considerations. 5 9 First, it should be recognized
that the greater the scope of discretion possessed, the more it is imperative
that the disparate interests that will be affected by a decision are presented to
the decision-maker. Rarely has the O.S.C. seemed to be formally aware of all the
158 See, e.g. the discussion of the discretionary powers contained in s. 61(1) in
Rivalda Investment Corp. Ltd. (Dec. 1965) O.S.C.B. 2: "this power must be exercised
with caution. The Director or the Commission, should not, except in the clearest of
cases, impose their judgment on the merits of an issue, in place of the judgment of
the investing public. The decision to purchase securities offered for sale must be that
of the purchaser. However, there are situations where the Director and the Commission
are entitled ... to require that certain safeguards be adopted for the benefit of the public?'.
Emerson feels that the O.S.C. "has exercised its discretion cautiously, responsibly
and not restrictively, [supra, note 55 at 45]; Baillie notes that it has "confined the scope
of its interference to policies and rules that few serious observers would claim to be
detrimental to the operations of the security industry", [supra, note 7 at 232, emphasis
added].
159 A summary and exposition of this general concept are to be found in Jowell,
supra, note 21. Many of the ideas expressed in the following paragraphs are derived from
Prof. Jowell's article. See also, Davis, supra, note 20, Wexler, supra, note 25, and A. D.
Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informed Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement (1972),
72 Cal. L. R. 1293.
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implications that arise from the formulation of standards in the adjudication
of individual cases.
Secondly, it is equally necessary to assess the inherent advantages and
disadvantages of legal control of discretion. This may be done in a strategic
sense by examining the effectiveness of particular legal techniques to achieve
the desired result, or it may be done by reference to functional criteria, assess-
ing whether the particular problem is amenable at all to legal control. Some
situations may be so complex, involving a myriad of relationships and inter-
faces, that each decision necessitates an intricate balancing of competing in-
terests and values. Thus, it may be quite difficult to regulate the securities
industry in the public interest while at the same time attempting to prevent
impediments to the free flow of capital. In addition, some decisional situations
may be unique, non-recurring, or not referable to a consensus, making de-
cisions even more discretionary.
Thirdly, it is insufficient if procedural standards are utilized to structure
discretion where substantive standards are incapable of elaboration. This leads
to "symbolic reassurance", a process by which various myths, such as regula-
tion in the public interest, are invoked "to achieve the quiescence of a poten-
tially critical public",260
One cannot afford to ignore the "reality of discretion" as it exists in the
securities field. While it is possible to provide some minimum substantive
standards, it would be naive to contemplate a neat set of rules, guidelines or
decisions that are capable of coping with inconsistent policies or the natural
variations of factual situations that are continually presented to the administra-
tion.10
1
With these caveats in mind, one can examine possible techniques for
bringing coherence to the exercise of discretion by the Director. While dis-
cretion has been seen to be necessary by the Legislature because of the com-
plexity of the securities field, the proper functioning of securities regulation
requires that the integrity of administrative decision-making be justified by the
formulation and application of rational standards.
Basically, there are two possible methods, neither of which is capable to
exclude discretion. One is adjudication, or the judicialization of decisions; the
other is rulemaking, which legalizes decisions. 162 An examination of the extent
to which both of these techniques are utilized by the Director and the O.S.C.
is necessary for any analysis of the discretionary powers contained in The
Securities Act.
1. Adjudication
Adjudication is inherently an incremental ad hoc approach. It declares
rules in specific cases, and enables the administrator to gain essential experi-
160 owell, id. at 219. See also M. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics, (Chi-
cago: U. of Illinois Press, 1964) for a general treatment of the theory of symbolic
reassurance.
161 Wexler, supra, note 25 at 139, 159.
12 Jowell, supra, note 21 at 180.
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ence before standards of general application can be formulated. It is flexible
in that the standard or standards applied can be examined in their own specific
situation, without the danger of distorting a general policy.
To a large extent, the exercise of discretion by the Director is accom-
plished by adjudication. Each of his decisions under sections 7 and 61 is made
not by reference to a firm set of rules, but by the application of vague standards
of acceptability. Such a process has several prerequisites. The situation must
be capable of resolution by adjudication, and the decision must be made on
the basis of some general guidelines that can be applicable to future cases, or
the integrity of the decisional process suffers. The examination of various cases
above indicates that there has been no real formulation of widely-known gen-
eral rules or standards, a practice which removes the Director's function from
the ideal situation described here.
Instead, the O.S.C. and the Director rely upon procedural techniques to
promote administrative decisional integrity. The sections of the Act providing
for review (section 7(2), 61 (2)) and establishing rules as to hearings (section
5) are an attempt to guarantee participation by the applicant in the decision-
making process. These rules provide a greater possibility for scrutiny, ac-
countability, and isolation from political or private interest group pressures,
yet say nothing about the content of the rules or standards that are utilized.
(i) O.S.C. Review
The main procedural control of the Director's discretion is found in the
provisions for the review of his decisions by the Commission. Its ostensible
purpose is to ensure that he acts within the scope of the Act and in accordance
with the rules of natural justice.1 3 The review section (28 (1)) is quite broad,
and enables any person or company "primarily affected" by a decision of the
Director, upon notice to the O.S.C., to request and be entitled to a hearing or
review. The use of the word "review"'16 4 is important, as the power of review
is usually considered to be wider than an appellate power.165 This is substanti-
ated by section 28 (2) which, in effect, allows the Commission to substitute its
judgment for that of the Director.
The empirical impression that one gains from a review of the cases is that
the Commission usually upholds the decision of the Director. Whether this
result is a function of organizational loyalty, or is simply derived from agree-
ment as to the substantive merits of a particular case is a matter of conjecture.
It does, however, reflect the Commission's perception of its role in review.
Two cases in which the O.S.C., under section 140(3), reviewed decisions
of the Toronto Stock Exchange (T.S.E.) are illustrative of the Commission's
16 Williamson, supra, note 55 at 257.
164 Oddly enough, the part of the Act in which this section is found is entitled
'Appeals'.
165 R. Reid, Administrative Law and Practice, (Toronto: Butterworths, 1971) at
438. Se also Re C. Cole & Co., [1965] 1 O.R. 33, af'd (1965), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 290.
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view of its function. These cases are applicable in that they raise the issue of
the extent to which the O.S.C. will review the exercise of discretion by one of
its statutory subordinate decision-makers. Some care must be taken in com-
paring the Director with the Stock Exchange, for both exercise different func-
tions, and occupy different positions in the securities administration.
In Edward Williams v. T.S.E.,166 the Exchange had refused the applicant
status as an approved person. The O.S.C. held that the standards of the two
authorities concerning acceptability could be different,167 and that there were
no grounds upon which it could interfere with the discretion of the T.S.E. unless
their standards were not consistent with the Commission's view of the public
interest.
In Lafferty, Harwood Partners, Ltd.,1 8 the O.S.C. did not consider it a
proper exercise of their jurisdiction to substitute their judgment for that of the
Exchange merely because they may have disagreed with the decision or would
have given different reasons. It was felt that only if there was an error of law,
or if new material evidence was available, would interference be proper.
Once this hurdle of deference is cleared, and the O.S.C. does seek to re-
view a decision of the Director, what functions are served thereby and how
can the discretion of the Director be structured? One important function, even
if a decision is upheld, is that the O.S.C. can be instrumental in making the
relevant policy explicit and enunciating relevant factors which will be utilized
in future cases. 09
Sometimes the O.S.C. will amend or modify a Director's order or ruling to
reduce its sharpness or perceived unfairness. Thus the Commission may up-
hold a decision refusing a prospectus, but allow the issuer to submit a revised
one.170 In the Webb decision (supra), the O.S.C. regarded the mitigating factors
in the case (reliance on superiors, unblemished record, and resulting unem-
ployment) and allowed the applicant to re-apply upon successful completion
of the Canadian Securities Course. However, this type of reasoning fails to
take cognizance that the re-application allowed merely subjected the applicant
to the Director's discretion for a second time, although the Director may have
felt bound to grant registration in those circumstances.
The reversal of a decision may have salutary effects as well. Those de-
cisions of the O.S.C. which have reversed a ruling of the Directors for his insuf-
ficient reasons undoubtedly will force the administrator to make the applicable
policy more explicit.' 7' In a recent appeal from a refusal of the Director to
166 [1972] O.S.C.B. 87.
167This seems to be an implied recognition by the Commission of the decision in
Re Larrimore Securities Ltd., supra, note 130 and discussion therein.
168 [1973] O.S.C.B. 26. This was affirmed by the Divisional Court in Re Lafferty,
Harworth Ltd. (1976), 8 O.R. (2d) 605.
160 E.g, Japan Fund of Canada Ltd., supra, note 140. See also Prima Mines Ltd.,
supra, note 137, where the O.S.C. stated: "The principle applied in this case will be
equally applicable in a large number of other cases."
170 Homex Realty & Development Co., O.S.C.W.B. 27 June 1973.
171 Walter J. Smolerck, [1968] O.S.C.B. 19.
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grant release of shares from escrow, the O.S.C. stated that when such a condi-
tion is imposed,
Its purpose should be clearly set out by the Director . . . for the subsequent
guidance of the Commission... In addition, where a decision is rendered refusing
an application... it would be helpful... if reasons could be prepared for the
benefit of both the appellant and the Commission.172
Thus, in the Marls case, 173 the O.S.C. approved the application for registration
of an unpopular "sharp operator". It stated that as there had been no specific
complaints or charges against the applicant, that he was an experienced person
familiar with the requirements of the Act, that he had provided a useful eco-
nomic function in the exploration and development of mining resources, and
that he was anxious to establish a good reputation, there should be no reason
to refuse registration. However meritorious this decision may be, it seems that
this type of decision is aimed more at correcting individual cases of injustice
than at establishing criteria which may guide decision-making.
A final benefit of review by the O.S.C. is that specific policy may be
changed. In C. J. Hodgson Ltd., 74 the Director had refused registration as an
investment counsel to an applicant company controlled directly and indirectly
by the principals of another company registered as an investment dealer and
broker. This was based on the established O.S.C. policy governing dual regis-
tration. The applicant submitted that a separate corporate identity and regis-
tration was required so that the clients of the controlling company could
deduct for tax purposes fees charged to them for counselling services provided
by the parent company. On review, and after consultation with the Department
of National Revenue, the Toronto Stock Exchange, and the Investment Deal-
ers Association, separate registration was allowed, in that a valid business
reason existed for this variance from established policy. Consequently, the
Commission explicitly amended the dual registration policy in its written
reasons to exclude investment dealers and brokers from its ambit.
(ii) Judicial Review
Section 29 (2) of The Securities Act provides that any person or company
"affected" by a decision of the O.S.C. may appeal to the Supreme Court of On-
tario. Because express provision is made for judicial review, it is not necessary
for this article to examine the applicability of the Judicial Review Procedure
Act to the Commission.'
7 5
Before examining the role of the courts in reviewing and checking the
Director's discretion, it is necessary to insert a warning as to its ultimate
efficacy. The time, expense, and unfavourable publicity involved in such a
172 Riley's Datashore International Ltd., [1974] O.S.C.B. 65.
173 Supra, note 128.
174 Supra, note 114.
175 S.O. 1971, c. 48. See generally D. J. Mullan, Reform of Judicial Review of Ad-
ministrative Action: The Ontario Way (1974), 12 O.H.L.J. 125, Not surprisingly, courts
have held that the extraordinary remedies of the prerogative writs for judicial review are
excluded by the appeal provisions of the Act: see Re Robertson & B.C. Securities Com-
mission (1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 135, [1974] 2 W.W.R. 165 (B.C.C.A.).
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process are often significant deterrents, especially if the person must, by the
necessity of his occupation, be subject to the continuing scrutiny of the
Director. This is especially evident in the case of a refusal of a prospectus;
the issuer's interest is capital financing, not litigation, and often it will seek
alternative means of financing. Coupled with the broad discretion of the
Director and the cost of litigation, it is not surprising that "the cases where a
company stands and fights in an attempt to sell its securities are few and far
between". 70
Other doctrinal barriers may be present to block appellate review. Section
29(2) does not give an absolute right of appeal as does section 28(2). A fair
amount of authority supports the notion that the courts confine themselves to
a review of the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial discretion, and do not
regard the exercise of an administrative discretion as coming within the scope
of their supervision. 177 Under this view, review is subject to a classification of
function, and it would be necessary to categorize the power of decision under
sections 7 and 61 as judicial or administrative. The classification approach in-
volves the application of several different tests of function which vary accord-
ing to different commentators.178 There is little agreement on the significance
of the distinction, the meanings attributed to the terms judicial and administra-
tive have been inconsistent,17 9 and the difference between the two appears to
be only one of degree.'80 Many believe that this approach is a means by which
courts can rationalize a decision based upon non-conceptual grounds, and one
which can be used to signal a court's intent to supervise an agency or to refrain
from doing so.""'
Although the classification of function test is thought to be of dwindling
practical significance it has been repeatedly applied by Ontario courts to the
exercise of discretion by the O.S.C. Past decisions have relied upon the test
enunciated in Re Ashby that "the distinguishing mark of an administrative
tribunal is that it possesses a complete, absolute and unfettered discretion, and
having no fixed standard to follow, it is guided by its own ideas of policy and
expediency". 8 2 Thus, it has been held that the Commission exercises an ad-
170 Loss & Cowett, supra, note 4 at 64. See also Mofsky, supra, note 154 at 274,
footnote 3. Nevertheless, while a right of appeal may be somewhat illusory due to the
broad nature of the Director's discretion, many will argue that a right of appeal will at
least ensure that it is not exercised in a discriminatory manner or in such a fashion that
general societal values are abused. Dickerson et al, supra, note 81 at 137; P. W. Hogg,
The Supreme Court of Canada and Administrative Law, 1949-71 (1973), 11 O.H.L.J.
187 at 189. Professor Hogg's views are set out in detail in Judicial Review in Canada:
How Much Do We Need It? (1974), 26 Admin. L. R. 337.
177 For a short but very helpful analysis on the approach of the Supreme Court of
Canada to the issue of administrative discretion, see P. W. Hogg, id. at 206-11. Reid,
supra, note 165 at 111. Recent decisions are Moore v. Minister of Manpower, [1968]
S.C.R. 839. Moosomen School Board v. Gordon, [1972] 3 W.W.R. 380; Howarth v.
National Parole Board (1975), 50 D.L.R. 349 (S.C.C.).
178 Generally, see Reid, id., at chapter 4; de Smith, supra, note 20 at 57-77.
170 De Smith, id., at 58.
180 Id., at 74.
18 1Id., at 58, Reid, supra, note 165 at 113; Hogg, supra, note 176 at 207.
182 [1934] OR. 421 at 428.
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ministrative and not a judicial function when acting under the registration
sections of the Act. 83 A more recent case held that "the determination to
receive a prospectus seems to be in the unfettered discretion of the Director
... the Commission exercises the function of an administrative body and not
of a judicial body when it accepts a prospectus and issues a receipt thereof".
184
As a result, an injunction and prohibition were held not to lie against the O.S.C.
as these remedies are only available against judicial bodies. 85
However, the decisions are inconsistent and conflict in many instances.
Some have held that the O.S.C. is an administrative tribunal exercising quasi-
judicial functions, and is therefore required to act in good faith, according to
rules of natural justice, s6 and cannot exceed its jurisdiction by an improper
use of its discretionary power.1 87 This general issue is further confused by
occasional cases which say that administrative functions must be performed
judicially, or in a judicial spirit.'88
Assuming that this preliminary hurdle can be met by the contention that
the appellate power of review is available regardless of the nature of the func-
tion being exercised,.8 9 there remains the grounds on which a court will inter-
fere with an administrator's decision. The scope of judicial review is de-
termined by many factors: the words of the applicable statute, the context in
which the power is exercised, the nature and purpose of the power, and the
subject matter to which it is related, among others. The judicial review with
which we are concerned is that dealing with the exercise of discretion, and not
the state of the facts upon which the validity of the administrative action de-
pends. For our present purposes, it is assumed that the Director acts within
his jurisdiction when he refuses a registration or a prospectus, although we
have indicated above that there exist situations in which he has acted without
reference to statutory guidelines.
Generally speaking, the courts have taken a restricted view of the scope
183 Re Securities Act & Gardiner, [1948] 1 D.L.R. 611 at 613. For other cases in
which the O.S.C. was held to be an administrative tribunal, see Duplain v. Cameron
(1960), 24 D.L.R. (2d) 619; O.S.C. v. Dobson (1957), 8 D.L.R. (2d) 604.
184 Voyageur Explorations Ltd. v. O.S.C., [1970] 1 O.R. 237 at 244.
185 De Smith, supra, note 20 at 337-422.
186 Re Clark and O.S.C. (1966), 56 D.L.R. (2d) 585; see also R. v. Alberta Securi-
ties Commission, ex parte Albrecht (1963), 36 D.L.R. (2d) 199.
187 Re Larrimore Securities Ltd., supra, note 130.
188 Reid, supra, note 165 at 116. This doctrine of the duty to act fairly was first
expressed in St. John v. Fraser, [1935] S.C.R. 441, per Davis, J. See also De Smith, supra,
note 20 at 208-09, 302-03, and J. Evans, The Duty to Act Fairly (1973), 36 Mod. L. R.
260. Recent developments in this area are reflected in Pearlberg v. Varty [1972] 2 All.
E.R. 6 (H.L.); R. v. Liverpool Corp.; Ex Parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators Assoc.,
[1972] 2 Q.B. 299 (C.A.); Furnell v. Whangarei High School Board, [1973] A.C. 660
(P.C.). To a lesser extent, a more sympathetic and informed approach has surfaced
recently in several lower court decisions in Ontario: Re Training Schools Advisory
Board, [1972] 1 O.R. 14 (H.C.); Re Cardinal & Board of Commissioners of Police
(1973) 2 O.R. (2d) 183, 42 D.L.R. (3d) 324 (D.C.); Re Robertson & Niagara South
Board of Education (1974), 1 O.R. (2d) 548, 41 D.L.R. (3d) 57 (D.C.) per Holland, J.
189 Smith & Rhuland Ltd. v. R., [1953] S.C.R. 95; Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959]
S.C.R. 121. See also 1 C.E.D. (3d) at para. 106.
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of review available to them regarding the exercise of discretionary powers,
even if a statutory right of appeal exists. °90 Referring to The Securities Act,
Aylesworth, J.A. has said:
In order to succeed upon an appeal brought under the relevant provisions of the
statute, the appellant must demonstrate error in principle by the Commission or
the decision it has made or perhaps as a facet of the same obligation, demonstrate
a clear misapprehension by the Commission of the facts with which it had to
deal upon its review. Further than that and assuming that on such an appeal to
us, the appellant has demonstrated error in principle or such misapprehension of
the facts, it remains for the appellant to satisfy this court that the order made
by the Commission should not have been made.' 9 '
The grounds upon which a discretionary decision may be quashed are
well known, and while an analysis of their applicability to particular cases in
securities regulation would be helpful, it is beyond the scope of the paper.
They are set out by the authorities and include bad faith, unreasonableness,
improper purpose, irrelevant considerations, failure to take into account rele-
vant considerations, and fettering of discretion by rigid policy. All of these are
relevant to the exercise of discretion by the Director, yet the reluctance of the
courts to interfere make it unlikely that an appeal under section 7 or 61 would
ever bear fruit, except perhaps in a case of obvious abuse.
Even if the court were to quash the decision, it is likely that it would
substitute its opinion for that of the O.S.C. or Director, and would instead direct
an administrative rehearing.' 92 This is despite a recent Supreme Court of
Canada decision that classified an appeal section similar to section 29 (1) as
a general right of appeal not limited to affirmation or reversal of the Com-
mission's decision. The effect of the section was held to be that the Court "on
appeal, has the same discretionary power as has the Commission".'9 s
It has been said that few discretionary powers are absolute or unreview-
able'1 4 in that "there is always a perspective within which a statute is intended
190 Cautious dicta in three Privy Council decisions seem to be the basis for this
approach. In these it was said that the discretion of the Minister of National Revenue
was not to be interfered with unless he disregarded a principle of law - MNR v. Wrights
Canadian Ropes Ltd., [1949] A.C. 109; had acted 'manifestly against sound and funda-
mental principles' - Pioneer Laundry v. MNR, [1940] A.C. 127 at 136; or he had acted
in bad faith, arbitrarily, or under the influence of irrelevant considerations - MNR v.
Fraser, [1949] A.C. 24 at 26. Related to this is the issue of delegation of discretionary
powers, where the Courts have condoned the unqualified delegation of discretion to
inferior tribunals. See e.g. Brant Dairy Co. v. Ontario Milk Commission (1973), 30
D.L.R. (3d) 559 (S.C.C.).
191 Re Southern Brokerage & Holding Co. and Alan Munro; unreported Ontario
Court of Appeal decision, 9 May 1967, found in June 1967 O.S.C.B. 4. See also Re
Securities Commission and Mitchell, [1957] O.W.N. 595; Re Securities Act and Norton,
( [1946] O.R. 492 at 496. For a recent application of this doctrine, see Maher Shoes Ltd.
v. O.S.C., [1971] O.S.C.B. 40 (unreported Ontario Court of Appeal), and Re Western
Ont. Credit Ltd. v. O.S.C. (1976), 9 O.R. (2d) 93 (D.C.).
192 See Re Lee and C.A.S. of County of Ontario, [1971] 1 O.R. 474 (Ont. H.C.)
where the court noted "It is trite law to say that the court will not compel a person to
exercise their discretion in a particular way."
103 Hretchka v. A.G. for B.C., [1972] S.C.R. 119. See also De Smith, supra, note
20 at 250.
104 De Smith, id., at 261.
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to operate and any clear departure from this is objectionable". 195 However,
with regard to The Securities Act, it is obvious that the courts are reluctant
to interfere, and the suitability of this forum as a means to control the Direc-
tor's discretion is highly dubious. 96
Since judicial review is of little practical benefit, it is necessary to assess
critically the concept of adjudication and review as an effective means to
structure discretion. The performance of the courts and the O.S.C. to date has
provided only a superficial air of legitimacy to the decision-making process.
It has allowed an incremental elaboration of policy on an ad hoc basis by a
negative, ex post facto technique which relies on the accident of litigation. The
vagueness of the applicable standards is such that those who wish to comply
with the securities laws as they are administered in Ontario must have resort
to specialists who, through their experience and skill, have developed the ex-
pertise necessary "to bring order out of the statutory and administrative
morass". 97 The inherent informality of the process has undoubtedly led to a
great reliance on the Director, which places him in a position of informal
power not contemplated by the legislation.
The adjudication process, because it is oriented to the settlement of
specific disputes, is unsuitable as the primary technique by which effective
and rational structuring of the securities business and the capital markets can
take place. Its deficiencies necessitate an inquiry into alternative, positive
means of controlling the discretion of the Director prior to or at the time of
decision.
2. Rule-Making
The most obvious alternative to adjudication is the legalization of de-
cision-making by subjecting the administrator's decision to predetermined
standards and rules. Professor Davis has been the main proponent of this ap-
proach, advocating that unnecessary discretion should be eliminated and that
necessary discretion should be properly confined, structured and checked by
the use of "open" techniques such as explicit rules, plans, policies, reasons
and decisions. 19 8 He rejects as falsely optimistic the idea that a sharper delinea-
tion of statutory standards is the answer, and sees agency rule-making as the
195 Roncarelli v. Duplessis, supra, note 189 per Rand, J. at 140.
196 The hesitancy of Canadian courts to review decisions of Securities Commissions
is contrasted to the more meaningful judicial and legislative review of the S.E.C. in the
United States by Baillie, supra, note 7 at 353. The Report of the Canadian Committee on
Mutual Funds and Investment Contracts (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) indicated at
350 that a decision by a security commission to reject a prospectus is "under present
practice, in fact unappealable", and recommended changes to enable a greater number
of appeals from such decisions. Id. at 356. Such a conservative approach by the Courts
is not without its various supporters who argue that judicial review of administrative
"policy" decisions ought to be curtailed. See e.g. W. H. Angus, Judicial Review in
Canada: Do We Need It? (1974), 26 Admin. L.R. 301; P. W. Hogg, supra, note 176;
P. C. Weiler, The Slippery Slope of Judicial Intervention: The Supreme Court and
Labour Relations (1971) 9 O.H.L.A 1.
197 Loss & Cowett, supra, note 4 at 44.
198 Davis, supra, note 20 at 99-116.
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proper device for the control of discretion. 99 While one may draw a distinc-
tion between the structuring and control of discretion, it is the suggestion of
this paper that the proper task in securities regulation is making the applicable
standards, as opposed to rules, explicit, not so much for the purposes of either
controlling or structuring the Director's discretion, but to enable critical
scrutiny and analysis of the merits of the policy that they contain.
One must not regard rule-making as the panacea for abuse of discretion.
It is subject to the general limitations previously outlined to the same extent
as adjudication. Davis merely presents us with an ideal, "a situation in which
a formally rational and systematic codification has eliminated as much 'un-
fettered' discretion (regardless of its outcome) as is possible, while incorporat-
ing that which is necessary in given situations into procedural and substantive
provisions which establish its legality and justify its exercise". 200 The criticism
of this approach must be recognized by anyone seriously concerned with the
problem of discretion. Most agencies will provide themselves with the discre-
tion they need as part of their own developmental process, as there are obvious
consequences in the adherence to an extreme rule of law doctrine. Discretion is
needed for individualized justice in those situations where while it might be
sufficient for an administrator to be aware of the permissible limits of his
authority, at the same time it is essential that his reaction is not rigidly de-
termined in advance. While adjudication suffers from an ex post facto temporal
orientation, rule-making has implicit limitations that are a function of its pre-
determination of conduct.
The traditional emphasis on legal procedures, including the elaboration
of substantive standards, often fails to appreciate the political element inherent
in administrative decision-making, so much so that some feel the only real
solution is a political reorganization and decentralization of power.201 In ad-
dition, rule-making is often limited in its conception of the administrative
process and organizational structure within which discretionary behaviour
occurs.
20 2
However, rule-making does have its advantages in comparison to ad-
199 Id., at 219.
200H. T. Wilson, 'Discretion' in the Analysis of Administrative Process (1972), 10
O.H.LJ. 121 at 129.
201 For a discussion of the naivet6 of the legal approach, see id. at 125-31. Edgar
and Jean Cahn were among the first to recognize that more than legal theories were re-
quired to force bureaucracies to accept and maintain notions of responsibility and ac-
countability. See The New Sovereign Immunity (1968), 81 Harv. L. R. 929. Wexler
argues that the traditional justifications for rules, e.g. the values of certainty, predicta-
bility, objectivity, depersonalization and holding arbitrary authority in check, are not as
great as traditional legal theory would have us believe. His prescription for this problem
is the encouragement and development of intelligent and responsible "personal authority".
Supra, note 25 at 181.
202 Wilson, id., at 133-39. For a discussion of the inapplicability of legal controls to
bureaucracy in the welfare context, see J. Handler, Controlling Official Behaviour in Wel-
fare Administration (1966), 54 Cal. L.R. 479; J. Handler, E. Hollingsworth, Reforming
Welfare: The Constraints of the Bureaucracy and the Clients (1969-70), 118 U. Pa. L.R.;
I. Denvir, Controlling Welfare Bureaucracy: A Dynamic Approach (1975), 50 Not.
Dam. Law R. 457.
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judication. It is not the antithesis of adjudication, for by providing specific
standards against which official decisions may be measured, any inconsistency
between decision and rule is subject to criticism and review. However, it is
superior in that is not dependent on the accident of litigation.
This approach is also conducive to the integrity of administrative de-
cision-making as it may tend to ensure compliance with policy and may tend
to remove the influence of improper criteria. It also may provide for greater
accountability to and participation by interested parties, thereby increasing
the acceptability of the system of regulation. Critical scrutiny may be initiated
by the process and be directed at both the decision and the content of the
applicable rule. Evidence of this approach is contained in section 6(7) of the
regulations, explained above, yet there is always the danger that those who are
regulated in the public interest often turn out to be the ones who finally de-
termine the content of the rules.20 3 However, over-reliance upon rules may
actually result in a situation where there are few, if any, opportunities for
interested or affected parties to challenge or influence existing policy.
2 04
The administrator may benefit himself by the use of explicit standards.
Specific guidelines allow for efficient planning, routinization, and allocation of
agency resources with greater flexibility than by adjudication. They may
enable the official to conserve his psychic and intellectual resources, preventing
the expenditure of energy and anxiety arising from a constant re-examination
of basic premises in the light of new conditions.
2 05
Any rule-making procedure must be concerned with the content, the re-
lationship with the objectives sought, and the ultimate effects of the rules
which are established. Attention must be given to ensuring that rigidity and
legalism do not become dominant, to the extent that there is an irrational ap-
plication of rules without regard to the organization's purposes.
The practice to date of the O.S.C. has been one which has followed the
adjudicatory approach in the implementation of legislative policy as perceived
by the Commission. An examination of the reported decisions has generally
revealed a lack of specific policy guidelines indicating the considerations the
Director deems relevant to the use of his statutory authority. Many com-
mentators have reacted adversely to this, claiming that a great deal of policy
is unstated and therefore unknown to the financial community which is the
regulated interest 20 6 This narrow attitude ignores the fact that apart from the
interest of the regulated, which is constantly being presented to and reinforced
by the Director and the O.S.C., there is the broader public interest in the
proper functioning of the capital markets which demands equal disclosure.
The alternative of rule-making has only been utilized to the extent re-
flected in the published regulations. Under section 147 the Cabinet has au-
203 On this point, see generally M. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent
Commission (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1955).
2 04 Wexler, supra, note 25 at 62.
2 05 Jowell, supra, note 21.
2 06 Bellmore, supra, note 48 at 210; Williamson, supra, note 55 at 245.
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thority to promulgate regulations that would cover the discretionary situations
incorporated in the Act. These may extend to "any matter necessary or ad-
visable to carry out effectively the intent and purpose of this Act.2 0 7 They are
subject to The Regulations Act208 with its minimum requirements for clarity
and publication; they must be consistent with the statute under which they
are enacted, and they must not effect a substantial addition to the enabling
legislation.200 Yet those that have been promulgated so far have merely been
used to flesh out the administrative and procedural structure of the regulatory
process without reference to substantive standards that could guide the ex-
ercise of discretion.2 1 0 Although the Cabinet has legal authority to enact these
legislative provisions, functionally the O.S.C. must take the initiative, and to
this extent, the practice to date indicates an abdication on the part of the
Commission of any substantial adherence to this approach.
What the O.S.C. has resorted to, in an attempt to supplement the ad-
judication process, is the increasing use of policy statements.2 " To a large
extent this practice is based on the residual discretion afforded to the Com-
mission and the Director in the Act.21 2 Their function can be justified on
several grounds, many of which have been noted. They represent a compro-
mise between adjudication and rule-making made necessary by the complexi-
ties of the securities industry and the notion that reliance on legislative enact-
ment of rules can only lead to obsolesence.21
To a large extent they indicate a preference for a less formal means of
policy formulation, as the O.S.C. has no statutory authority to enact its own
regulations, although it is suggested above that functionally they have ignored
their ability to initiate this type of process. Policy statements are a means to
avoid the inflexibility of regulations and the procedures required by The
Regulations Act. In addition, they can be utilized to test policy not yet definite-
ly formulated without the need for binding regulations or the ad hoc method
of adjudication, yet still give the affected parties an idea of what to expect. 21 4
The legal issue of importance here is the extent to which these policy
statements can extend beyond the standards contained in the Act and regula-
tions. Several commentators have doubted the legal validity of policy state-
ments that do not merely represent clarification of existing legislative objec-
tives, and have questioned the use of such a jurisdictional base for the creation
207 S. 147(u).
208 R.S.O. 1970, c. 410.
200 See e.g. Gach v. Director of Welfare, [1973] 3 W.W.R. 558 (Man. C.A.); Re
A.G. Can. and Paulsen (1974), 38 D.L.R. (3d) 225.
2 10 Williamson, supra, note 55 at 245.
211 Bray, supra, note 2 at 430; Lockwood, supra, note 83 at 123; Kimber Report,
supra, note 3 at para. 3:06.
212 The Merger Study noted that this situation gave to the administrators "the op-
portunity of offering guidance through policy statements as to the circumstances under
which this discretion may be exercised". Supra, note 2 at para. 2:05.
213 Baillie, supra, note 7 at 210.
214 H. Molot, The Self-Created Rule of Policy and Other Ways of Exercising Dis-
cretion (1972), 18 McGill L. J. 310 at 338.
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of policy.215 The increasing use of policy statements that do not embody legis-
lative or even executive approval, not only means that the O.S.C. is more
likely to overlook its jurisdictional boundaries, but also that the policy rulings
may become overly concentrated on companies or persons subject to prospec-
tus and registration requirements.2 16 This may therefore reinforce the motiva-
tion of many to seek exemptions from regulation.
The previous discussion of cases has indicated that as non-legislative
guidelines, policy statements have been applied within the adjudicatory frame-
work to the extent they become rules of general application having the force
of law. However, due to the complexity of the regulated subject-matter, "the
dividing line between legitimate pursuit of a general policy.., and the en-
forcement of an extra-statutory regulation may be narrow and sometimes
difficult to draw".21
Judicial authority on the relationship between policy statements and the
exercise of discretion is quite clear. It is well established that while an agency
may formulate guidelines in advance, it must not fetter its discretion by a rigid
policy that prevents the agency from exercising that discretion in individual
cases.218 The policy must be adopted for the attainment of legitimate objec-
tives authorized by the enabling statute, yet must not have the binding effect
of legislation.219 The law has thus attempted to fashion a compromise between
the administrative requirements of policy formulation and the interests of the
individual party affected.
This judicially created limit is explicitly recognized by the Commission.
In its recent comments on draft additions and amendments to a particular
policy, the OSC has noted that policies "are guidelines only... the Director
will exercise (his) discretion to meet special or unusual circumstances".2 0
The courts have often emphasized the need for making policy guidelines
explicit-221 This can be coupled with the judicial requirement that in certain
cases the material on which an agency will base its decision must be disclosed
to the affected party222 In recent years, the courts have indicated a willingness
215Id. at 314; Lockwood, supra, note 83 at 123; Baillie, supra, note 7 at 214.
216 Baillie, Securities Regulation in the Seventies, supra, note 7 at 354.
217 Molot, supra, note 214.
218 De Smith, supra, note 20 at 274; R. v. Port of London Authority, [1919] 1 K.B.
176 at 184 (C.A.); Lloyd v. Superintendent of Motor Vehicles, [19711 3 W.W.R. 619;
Jackson v. Beaudry (1969), 70 W.W.R. 572, 7 D.L.R. (3d) 737; Re North Coast Air
Services Ltd., [1972] F.C. 390 (C.A.). But see Alden v. Gaglardi, [19731 30 D.L.R. (3d)
760, where a Department of Welfare was held not to have exceeded its statutory powers
by the enactment of a policy that denied eligibility for welfare to workers who were
unemployed by reason of a labour dispute.
2 19 Re Hopedale Developments Ltd. v. Oakville, [1968] O.R. 659 (C.A.).
220 O.S.C. Weekly Summary, May 30, 1974; see also Amendment to Policy 3-03,
O.S.C.B. November, 1971.
221 Re Hopedale Developments Ltd., supra, note 219.
222 R. v. Ontario Racing Commission; ex parte Taylor, [1971] 1 O.R. 400 (C.A.);
Knapman v. Board of Health for Saltfleet Township, [1954] O.R. 360 (H.C.).
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to widen their scrutiny of the agency's perception of its guiding policy and that
expressed in the tribunal's governing legislation.22 This trend may be signifi-
cant in restricting the use of policy statements by the O.S.C. as grounds for
decision-making.
Advocates of change in this area are divided between clarification of
existing policy and its increased publication and dissemination, and the
legislative enactment of all policy in the form of regulations.2
5 One might
easily conclude that having regard to the limits, costs and benefits of both, a
superior system would incorporate a synthesis of their respective advantages.
Thus it might be suggested that the O.S.C. be given statutory power to enact its
own regulations, subject to approval by a responsible public authority, i.e.,
the Cabinet. With specific requirements for consultation and participation in
the rule-making function and widespread dissemination of promulgated
policym2G it can be argued that this would best serve the legislative objectives
of The Securities Act.
The obvious and fatal weakness of this remedy is that it effectively ignores
the public interest. Provision for rule-making could only lead to a greater
tendency by the regulated interests to fashion the content of the rules ap-
plicable to themselves. Indications of this can be seen in both the statute
(section 6(7) of the Regulations), and in practice. Policy statements are often
presented in draft form and comments from the "interested" parties are wel-
comed. Relevant to this is the not surprising practice that in the current debate
over Bi 98 representatives of the financial community are making submissions
to the O.S.C. and not to the legislative committee responsible for the Bill. The
Commission is implicitly viewed as the protector or spokesman for the regu-
lated interests. Rule-making would only aggravate this. It is suggested there-
fore that the Commission is not the proper forum for this task, that legislative
objectives be made more clear, and that emphasis be placed on making ex-
plicit the Director's guiding standards in order that their merits may be subject
to public scrutiny.
223 Metro Life Insurance Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers, [1970]
S.C.R. 425. The leading case in the area of jurisdictional abuse of power is Anisminic
Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission (1969), 2 W.L.R. 163 (H.L.). See H. Wade,
Constitutional and Administrative Aspects of the Anisminic Case (1969), 85 L.Q.R. 198.
224 Baillie, supra, note 7 at 237; Merger Study, supra, note 2 at para. 2:05; William-
son, supra, note 55 at 245.
225 Kimber Report, supra, note 3 at para. 8:06; Bellmore, supra, note 48 at 224.
The McRuer Report suggested that there 'be inserted in the governing act in as precise a
form as possible what considerations the authority may or may not take into account in
reaching its decision'. Report of the Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights (1968),
Vol. IH, at 1104.
220 This model is similar to that contemplated by the American Administrative
Procedure Act which divides the functions of agencies between rule-making and ad-
judication. A good summary of the issue is found in D. Shapiro, The Choice of Rule
Making or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy (1965), 78 Har.
L. R. 921. For a discussion in the context of American securities regulations, see Com-
ment, SEC Rule 144: The Development of Objective Standards in the Administrative
Process (1972), 45 Temple L. Q. 403.
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G. INFORMAL RESTRAINTS ON DISCRETION
The great amount of emphasis placed on formal procedural and sub-
stantive means of structuring the Director's discretion fails to account for a
host of informal factors which impose natural or human restraints on ad-
ministrative discretion, and which may also serve to increase the scope of
available power. Only recently have studies been made of the highly discre-
tionary and informal practices which exist in any sophisticated administrative
system.227
The Director has various informal methods of exercising his power, which
are not to be confused with his statutory authority. Thinly veiled threats of
potential investigations, sanctions, and the resulting adverse publicity, informal
advisory rulings, and even press releases and speeches are all means by which
parties subject to the jurisdiction of the O.S.C. are affected. The deterrent in-
fluence of discretion should not be overlooked, for the potential power that
may be exercised by an administration, even if it be unreasonable, may have
salutory effects on the regulated interests.228
However, decisions may be constrained by factors that have hitherto
escaped the attention of lawyers, academics, or the administrators themselves.
One authority has undertaken a sophisticated analysis of the "decisional
referents" that affect the exercise of discretion 229 Commencing from the
insights offered by Professors Hart and Dworkin into the relevance of the
rule-internalization by an administrator of the obligations which the legal
and administrative system imposes on him to decide in accordance with its
mandates, Gifford proceeds to an examination of how the administrator is led
to conform to his own self-created rules. Attached to this is the important
concept that one must realize that an administrator's perception of the con-
straints which bind him are frequently different from external expectations
of others.
The bulk of the analysis is devoted to an examination of possible factors
that can influence the decision-maker, apart from the applicable statute or
policy. Even when external standards are imposed, informal or internal con-
siderations will often dictate the weight that will be attached to them. Ex-
amples of such "non-rule referents" are numerous and varied. These include
the factual context of the decision, the need to be sheltered from public or
2 2 7 Initial efforts have been directed at the informal discretion exercised by law
enforcement agencies: See e.g. Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Involve the Criminal
Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice (1960) 69 Yale LJ.
543; N. Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion
(1971), 19 U.C.L.A. Rev. 1. For a more recent examination of the United States Im-
migration and Naturalization Service, see A. D. Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal
Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement (1972) 72 Col. L. R. 1293. This latter
article draws upon the empirical data given by Sofaer in The Change of Status Ad-
judication: A Case Study in the Informal Agency Process (1972) 1 J. Legal Studies 349.22 8 Sofaer, Judicial Control of Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, id., at
1297.
229 Gifford, supra, note 25. For other remarks on informal factors see Willis, supra,
note 16, and Bellmore, supra, note 48 at 211.
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collegial criticism, analytical technique and professional discipline, prior ex-
perience, approaches and values shared with others, and the dynamic aspects
of human interaction with the participants in the decision. These referents are
not restricted to past events, but are often future oriented because the legislative
mandates require formulation of decisional criteria to govern future conduct.
Other types of decisional referents include the use of studies and analyses,
and consultation with specialized disciplines. These latter two factors are quite
evident in the development of the O.S.C. as a regulatory agency, and are dictated
by its regulated subject matter. It utilizes or employs a large proportion of
professionals, and has been responsible for several major studies which provide
it with the information necessary for qualitative decisions.
Organizational factors may influence the Director in the exercise of his
discretion. Cost-benefit analysis is often unconsciously applied in determining
the allocation of scarce administrative resources to a backlog of cases. It is
not surprising then to see a close relation between delay, delegation of de-
cision-making (i.e. to Deputy-Directors), and the exercise of discretion. 2
30
The increasing scope of the Commission's activities, and the lack of adequate
resources2;3 may mean that the Director is not often able to exercise his dis-
cretion in a totally rational and consistent manner, perhaps to the detriment
of the public interest.
The crucial point of this analysis is the recognition that disclosure of rules
or policy is insufficient for a proper understanding of the exercise of discretion.
The conclusion that the major decisional referents of the administrator, how-
ever underdeveloped they might be, must be made explicit 232 is consistent with
the thesis of this article.
H. THE FUTURE: BILL 98
The foregoing analysis has shown that the discretion allocated to the
Director of the O.S.C., however necessary it is in the public interest, is quite
broad, both in its legislative expression and the interpretation given to it by
the Director. One commentator has noted, "it is difficult to see how the On-
tario Securities Commission could have more discretionary power than it now
exercises with respect to the registration of securities".
83
Bill 98, which is a substantial revision of The Securities Act and is cur-
rently before the Ontario legislature, negates this contention completely. It
also fails to recognize the need, elaborated in this article for all relevant
standards applicable to the exercise of the Director's discretion to be made
explicit in the interest of both the public and the financial community. The
legislature has obviously placed no urgent priority on passage of this legislation,
:280 S. Nagel & C. Curris, The Exercise of Procedural Discretion by the Regulatory
Agencies (1964-65), 17 Admin. L.R. 173.
231 Baillie, supra, note 7 at 210.
232 Gifford, supra, note 25 at 21.
=3 Smith, supra, note 7 at 474-75.
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for it has been over three years since it was first introduced.234 Since then the
Bill has undergone considerable alterations and revisions, which is not sur-
prising, given the nature and influence of those whom it seeks to regulate.
Under section 25(1) of the Bill the Director retains the same authority
as he now does under section 7 of the existing Act, yet added to this is the
power to grant reinstatement or amendments to registration. No change has
been made in the vague standards of suitability that are applicable. Section
23(2) of the Bill's predecessor (Bill 75) was a new addition that required the
Director to approve any director of a registrant. Not only would this have added
to the workload of the registration staff,235 but it would also have enabled the
Director to continue to apply, on a broader basis, the ill-defined policy as to
character and ethical conduct of registrants which was found to be suspect.
This provision has been dropped from the current proposals.
Section 62, which governs the issuance of a final receipt for a prospectus
is different in several aspects from the current provision. It incorporates a sub-
stantial increase in the scope of the Director's discretion. Section 62(1)
provides that the Director "shall issue a receipt ... unless it appears to him
that it is not in the public interest to do so". While the use of the word "shall"
is undoubtedly intended to clear up the doubt expressed earlier whether the
Director can exercise a discretion if the statutory grounds for refusal do not
exist, the standard of the public interest is so vague that it destroys any utility
of the imperative duty assigned to the Director. What the Legislature gave with
one hand, it more than took away with the other. It is obvious from past deci-
sions made under section 61(1), and the attitude of the Ontario Courts, that
this amorphous standard can be used to justify almost any interference, except
perhaps the most blatant example of refusal made with no reference to the
legislative purpose or the public interest.
Section 62(2) makes explicit the requirement that the Director refuse a
prospectus if the situations in paragraphs (a) to (h) are present. While this
attempt at statutory elaboration of standards is commendable, it falls short
for two reasons. The first is that the very wide discretion allowed in section
62(1) renders many of these grounds irrelevant. The second is that the two
new grounds that have been added will only invite more arbitrary decisions.
Paragraphs (d) and (e) allow the Director to refuse to issue a receipt on the
grounds of financial irresponsibility, and past conduct that indicates "the
business of the issuer will not be conducted in accordance with law and with
integrity". 3 They allow the Director to examine the applicant and any officer,
director, promoter or control person of it for evidence that any of these
grounds might exist.
The implications of these paragraphs are particularly odious. They pur-
port to give statutory approval to those decisions of the Director in which the
234 Bill 154 was first introduced in the Ontario Legislature on June 1, 1972. It under-
went considerable revision and was reintroduced as Bill 75 on June 7, 1974. Subsequent
amendments are found in the current Bill 98, which was introduced on May 30, 1975.
235 The workload is already increased by the addition of new classes of registration
in s. 23(1) (d) (e) (f).
236 These grounds are similar to the standards imposed in other provincial occupa-
tional licencing statutes, see supra, note 102.
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conditions of financial responsibility and business integrity were breached by
applicants for registration. Thus, standards applicable to the control of access
to the occupational field of securities have been transposed to the control of
access to the capital markets.
A more important consideration is less obvious. While these conditions
may appear to be in the public interest, past experience has shown that they
can be applied in a manner that protects the interest of those whom the Act is
intended to regulate. No apparent consideration is given to the economic rami-
fications of this discretion, and the power of the Cabinet to make regulations
under section 136, is more limited than now permitted.237 The possibility of the
elaboration of substantive standards has thus been diminished, and the effect of
this lack of legislative power of the Cabinet on the validity of future policy
statements is open to question. Thus, the approach taken by the Bill could re-
sult in litigation that might negate the intended purpose of the reform.
Bill 98 attempts to meet some of these problems by increasing the oppor-
tunity for review of decisions of the Director. Section 8 provides that he must
forthwith notify the Commission of every decision under sections 25 or 62 in
which he refuses registration or the issue of a receipt for a prospectus and the
Commission may notify both the Director and directly affected parties of its
intention to review the decision. This appears to be an attempt to ensure that
policy decided on an adjudicative basis will not be dependent on the initiative
and financial wherewithal of the affected party or parties.
Section 62(4) provides for a referral by the Director to the O.S.C. of a
material question involving the public interest under section 62(2) that may
result in the Director refusing to issue a receipt for a prospectus. The Commis-
sion is required to consider and determine the question and refer the matter
back to the Director for final consideration, and, although subject to an order of
the Supreme Court under section 9, the decision of the former is binding on
the latter (sections 62(7), (8) ).
These provisions, it seems, add little more than another level to the ad-
judicative side of O.S.C. policy formulation, and are complemented by the
failure of the Bill to flesh out the jurisdictional basis for the issue of policy
statements. Instead of providing a more clear indication of legislative intent
regarding the purpose and direction of securities regulation, the legislature has
decided to allow the O.S.C. to substitute its discretion for that of the Director.
The increased scope of discretion vested in the Director and the Commis-
sion may lead paradoxically to its ineffectiveness in another way. The un-
defined substantive control allocated to them may be so great that it will en-
courage more issuers and registrants to seek exemptions from the requirements
of the Act. It is not surprising then to see that the submissions made so far to
the O.S.C. concerning Bill 75 make little explicit reference to these sections, 238
237No provision similar to section 147(u) of the present Act is to be found in s. 136
of the Bill.
238 See e.g. Blake, Cassels & Graydon, Submission to the O.S.C. Regarding Bill 75,
October 22, 1974.
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and emphasis can be expected to be placed on the need for broader exemp-
tions. Apparently, the regulated interests have no quarrel with this extended
discretion. The result is contrary to the public interest, in that a substantial
amount of new securities, probably of better quality, can be expected to be
offered to institutional investors or private placees, to the exclusion of the
general investing public.
The provisions of Bill 98 relating to the Director's control over registra-
tion and acceptance of prospectuses fail to meet the need, elaborated in this
article, for effective regulation in the public interest. Regardless of whether he
acts by means of adjudication or rule-making in the exercise of his discretion,
the Director is still engaged in the formulation of securities policy. The major
decisional referents affecting this exercise must be made explicit to establish
a predictive basis for rational policy and its application.
A policy of disclosure similar to that which is being advocated can benefit
both the public and the regulated interests. The regulated parties will be able
to negotiate more effectively on the basis of knowledge of the relevant con-
siderations, to appeal more expeditiously any application of improper factors
or the improper use of relevant considerations, and to assess the hierarchical
level at which they may best attempt to have policy changed. 39
The public interest is served in that the applicable premises upon which
the Director acts can be compared with the purposes of the overall regulatory
and legislative framework within which he is situated. This, of course, is pre-
dicated on effective review of both aspects by both elected representatives and
public interest groups or institutions. How this can be achieved is open to
further study. But to give power to the Director and/or the Commission to
regulate according only to the vague standards of the public interest and suit-
ability, merely reinforces the fundamental sterility of the O.S.C. Statutory
language and sporadic action by the Commission against individuals or com-
panies for occasional breaches of the statute are functional only to provide
symbolic reassurance to achieve public acquiesence. 2 40 No opportunity is given
by which one can critically analyse the assumptions and objectives on which
policy is based. In the meantime, the economic and political influence of the
securities industry and the growing interdependence between the regulated and
the regulators can only result in the gradual loss of autonomy by both the
Director and the Commission. They have become concerned, on a daily basis,
with the industry that they seek to regulate; they are dependent on it for a
good deal of its knowledge; and many of its members and staff come from or
go into the securities business. The practice of inviting comments from the
financial community in the elaboration of O.S.C. policy and the constant ex-
posure to the regulated interest can only lead to an absorption of its values
and biases by the administrators. The emphasis of this article has been not so
much on the regulation of the Director as it is on the regulation of the securi-
ties community and the capital markets through his discretion. One must not
289 Gifford, supra, note 25 at 21.
240 For an extended treatment of this concept of symbolic reassurance and the in-
terests of the regulated, see Edelman, supra, note 160.
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confuse procedural justice to self-interested parties with substantive merits of
policy, for the real issue is not the fact of discretion, but the manner in which
it is exercised. Strict reliance on rule-making procedures may restrict the
opportunities of effective challenge to policies by reducing legal issues to mere
questions of fidelity to the rules.241 While some may argue that the answer to
these problems lies in the potential of judicial review to limit and control dis-
cretion,2 42 a careful examination of our courts' approach to discretionary
decision-making and illustrates their dysfunctionalities in dealing with complex
policy issues.
Discretion is a necessary adjunct of securities administration and regula-
tion. In many instances it is unavoidable, and in others, it is the only feasible
way in which an administration may demonstrate flexibility, creativity, ex-
pertise and sensitivity. However, discretion need not be overly broad, open-
ended or untrammelled to achieve these objectives. The substantially undefined
power of the Director to refuse registration under section 7, and the failure
to restrict him to the statutory grounds for refusing to issue a receipt for a
prospectus have important consequences. The most obvious and explainable
are the inconsistencies that result from the application of conflicting or con-
fusing policies. A second group of consequences, which demand more em-
pirical research are the economic implications that are to be derived from the
exercise of discretion, be it by adjudication or rule-making.
A third, and equally important consequence of excessive discretion is the
opportunity that it allows for extensive and successful intervention and in-
fluence by the regulated interests. One must be careful not to place too much
stress on a simplified "capture theory" of administrative agencies, for as
Professor Jaffe has pointed out, this often-times exaggerates the significance
of the regulated in the "peculiar political process which provides the milieu
and defines the activities of each agency".243 It is essential to recognize that
the vulnerability of the agency is often determined by the extent to which the
legislation has adequately defined and rationalized the purpose and objectives
of the agency.
It is suggested that the answer to these problems lies in the encourage-
ment and development of more elaborate and better defined standards by
which the discretion of the Director may be guided. This can not be achieved
quickly and comprehensively by relying upon a transformation of current
judicial attitudes towards court review of discretionary powers. Nor is a work-
able solution likely to be found in a complex myriad of stringent rules and
regulations, for some room must be left for the rational resolution of the
marginal equities which are bound to appear.
244
241 Wexler, supra, note 25 at 162.
242 Sofaer, supra, note 227 at 1294-95.
243 L. L. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration (1972-73), 86 Harv. L. R.
1183 at 1188.
244 Sofaer, supra, note 227 at 1298. In this regard, see M. Kadich & S. Kadich, On
Justified Rule Departures by Officials (1971), 59 Cal. L. R. 905.
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What is feasible is to require greater legislative activity in devising a
statutory scheme governed by readily-identifiable rules and standards which
set out, as much as possible without impeding administrative and organiza-
tional imperatives of flexibility and efficiency, the consequences which will
follow certain actions.2 45 Where the complexity, or indeed the triviality of the
subject matter cannot reasonably be entertained by the elected component of
government, then the O.S.C. should be able to develop its own fully disclosed
standards through the use of policy statements, provided of course that there is
an ample jurisdictional base for such procedures. Administrative necessity
dictates that discretion be allocated to the Director, yet the public interest
requires that it be structured and made explicit in such a manner that the
interests of the wider community are not only represented but also served.
245 This approach is evident in the legislative scheme that is the basis of the new
Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1974-75, c. 33. In the draft regulations pub-
lished in May, 1975, it was stated in the foreword that the purpose of the expanded
regulation-making powers of the Act were, inter alia: "To confine administrative dis-
cretion within reasonable boundaries so that persons affected by the regulations are
aware of the substantive standards applied ... to structure as clearly as possible the ad-
ministrative procedures so that persons affected can comply more easily with the law...".
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